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ABSTRACT
JOSEPH DANIEL URA: The Effects of Judicial Review
in American Politics.
(Under the direction of Georg Vanberg.)
At least since Robert Dahl’s (1957) pathbreaking essay, “Decision-Making in a Democ-
racy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” political scientists have invested
tremendous energy in exploring linkages between the Supreme Court and its environment.
This dissertation joins those efforts by offering studies of three such paths of influence
flowing from the judiciary. In turn, I investigate the effects of Supreme Court decisions
on public opinion, the role of judicial review in legislative decision-making, and the re-
sponsiveness of the media’s agenda to Supreme Court decision-making. In all cases, the
evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s influence extends beyond the legal world and
into the larger political system.
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Chapter 1
The Supreme Court and Public
Opinion Reconsidered
At least since Robert Dahl’s (1957) seminal essay on the role of the Supreme Court in
the American political system, political scientists have been concerned with the linkages
between the nation’s highest court and its external political environment. Much of the
literature that has followed in Dahl’s footsteps has concerned itself with the relationship
between the Court’s policy choices and public opinion. Specifically, scholars have often
asked: Does the mass public react systematically to Supreme Court decision-making?
There are numerous reasons to suspect that this is the case. First, many of the
Supreme Court’s most prominent cases involve “easy issues” (Carmines and Stimson
1989): race, abortion, separation of church and state, and free speech are prominent
examples. Even relatively unsophisticated observers can make political sense of many
Supreme Court decisions. Second, the Supreme Court can focus the media’s attention
to specific issues, altering the national political agenda (Flemming, Bohte, and Wood
1997; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999). There are also important policy consequences
attached to Supreme Court decisions. As the Supreme Court speaks men and women are
executed or not (Furman v. Georgia 1972; Gregg v. Georgia 1976; Atkins v. Virginia
2003), affirmative action programs are renewed or repealed (Regents of the University of
2California v. Bakke 1978; Gratz v. Bollinger 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger 2003), abortions
are provided or banned (Roe v. Wade 1973; Harris v. McCrae 1980; Planned Parenthood
v. Casey 1992), and votes in Florida are recounted or not (Bush v. Gore 2000). Finally,
even in cases of noncompliance with Supreme Court decisions (Rosenberg 1991), the
Supreme Court’s decisions may have a powerful symbolic effect. For example, many
people are clearly moved by the fact that the Court has banned a great deal of comingling
between church and state. Given all this, it may not be surprising to see predictive effects
flowing from the Supreme Court to public opinion.
Yet, most scholarly inquiry into this question has concluded that there is no general
relationship between Supreme Court decision-making and national public opinion (e.g.
Bass and Thomas 1984; Caldeira 1991, Hoekstra 2000, 2003; Marshall 1989; Johnson
and Martin 1998). This conclusion is built on the dearth of evidence that Supreme Court
decision-making affects individuals’ absolute policy preferences. When the Supreme Court
makes policy on some issue, there is little systematic evidence that, on a national scale,
people who had previously opposed a position selected by the Court change their minds
and adopt the Court’s position as their own. In the jargon of this literature, the Court
does not generally “legitimize” policy positions in the mass public.
Despite this relatively well established conclusion, there is at least one other pathway
from Supreme Court decision-making into public opinion which deserves consideration. It
is possible that, as the Court makes public policy, it affects the public’s relative preferences
for the direction of future policy change. As I will discuss in greater detail, as the Supreme
Court moves policy in one ideological direction or another, it either satisfies or exacerbates
some public demand for future policy change, even though the Court’s action may have
had no effect on the underlying distribution of absolute preferences in the mass public.
In this chapter, I argue that Supreme Court decision-making has important effects
for relative public opinion, that is, for public opinion about the direction of future pol-
icy changes. I argue that the American mass public responds systematically to Supreme
3Court decision-making in a manner consistent with a thermostatic model of public opin-
ion. Specifically, I demonstrate that there is a significant, negative relationship between
Supreme Court decision-making and public policy Mood (Stimson 1999). In short, the
public responds in an orderly and predictable way to Supreme Court decision-making.
1.1 The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: The
Legitimation Hypothesis
In 1957, Robert Dahl (1957) speculated that a major function of the Supreme Court in the
American political system was to legitimize the policy choices of the national lawmaking
majority. Dahl argued that the Court’s special relationship with the Constitution, com-
bined with the public’s apparently broad and deep support for the judiciary, would imbue
policies upheld by the Supreme Court with legitimacy they would not otherwise enjoy.
In other words, Dahl argued that the Supreme Court legitimizes public policies: when
the Court speaks on an issue public support should swing toward the position it adopts.
Since Dahl’s essay appeared, political scientists have spent considerable time and energy
examining his legitimation hypothesis. However, most scholars who have examined that
conjecture have rejected it.
Marshall (1989), for example, examines each of 18 instances over a 45-year period
where survey data exist on aggregate public opinion on issues shortly before and after
relevant Supreme Court decisions. He finds no systematic relationship between Supreme
Court decisions and the public’s issue preferences, let alone a consistent pattern support-
ing the legitimation hypothesis. Indeed, Marshall finds that the mean shift in public
opinion surrounding a Supreme Court decision is 0.06%. Likewise, Franklin and Kosaki
(1989) find that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) homogenized within
group preferences on abortion, though it did not affect the aggregate distribution of public
opinion on that issue (See also Johnson and Martin 1998). These findings are supported
4by experimental results that indicate that the Supreme Court does not have a legit-
imizing effect (Bass and Thomas 1984; But see Mondak 1990, 1994). Gregory Caldeira
(1991) summarizes the null result dominance in this field: “[W]e have relatively few well-
documented instances when the Supreme Court has shaped the aggregate distribution of
public support for this or that policy... We [will] do better, I think, to look for shifts
within segments of the population” (1991, 312).
Valerie Hoekstra and Jeffrey Segal (1996; Hoekstra 2000, 2003) explicitly accept
Caldeira’s critique of the literature. They argue that students of the relationship between
the Supreme Court and public opinion should narrow their focus, looking for evidence
of legitimation within subpopulations, such as residents of particular geographic areas or
demographic groups, resulting from Supreme Court decisions in which a group may have
a special interest. In particular, Hoekstra’s (2000, 2003) finding that Supreme Court deci-
sions significantly affect attitudes in the communities from which cases originate supports
this theoretical position.
The search for general support for the legitimation hypothesis is a quest for evidence
of positive feedback from Supreme Court decision-making to public opinion. For the
legitimation hypothesis to be valid, the Supreme Court must move the absolute preferences
of the public on any given issue that it decides towards its own preferences. And while
the legitimation hypothesis remains a natural theoretical extension of Dahl’s claims about
the role of the Supreme Court in the American political system, evidence of legitimation
has been difficult to find in practice.
1.2 The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: A Ther-
mostatic Model
While most evidence suggests that the Supreme Court does not generally legitimize policy
attitudes, it is possible that the Supreme Court’s ability to make public policy may have an
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Figure 1.1: The Supreme Court and Relative Policy Preferences
effect on the public’s relative preferences for policy change. To see this dynamic, consider
a hypothetical uniform distribution of citizens in a unidimensional, liberal-conservative
policy space where there exists some status quo policy, Q1 (Figure 1.1). Each individual in
this space has some absolute preference, a policy ideal point. And, each also has a relative
preference for the direction of future policymaking—those to the left of the status quo
prefer “more liberalism” in the future; those to the right would prefer “less liberalism.”
Now, suppose the Supreme Court changed public policy in a liberal direction, creating
a new status quo atQ2. If the Court does not legitimize policy attitudes, there would be no
redistribution of citizen’s ideal points as a result of the change in the status quo. However,
the change in policy would produce a change in the proportion of citizens expressing a
preference for “more liberalism” in future policymaking. Citizens whose ideal points fall
between the old policy and the new policy would have expressed a preference for “more
liberalism” before the Court acted and “less liberalism” afterward. So, while the Court
may have no effect on the aggregate distribution of absolute preferences, it may have an
impact on the distribution of relative preferences. And, generally, as the Court makes more
and more liberal or conservative decisions over time, individuals will continue to exhibit
changes in their relative preferences for future policy changes in the opposite direction of
policymaking. In other words, there will be negative feedback from policymaking by the
6Supreme Court in the public’s relative policy preferences.1
This micro theory has a clear macro implication: the accumulation of public policy
changes emanating from the Court should produce dynamic, negative responses in the
public’s preference for the direction of future policy change. This line of thinking amounts
to a thermostatic model of public opinion.
Thermostatic models of public opinion posit that the mass public behaves as a political
thermostat: when policy deviates from the public’s ideal position, it signals policymakers
to adjust policy in a corrective direction. These models have been applied broadly to
study the national government’s responsiveness to changes in public opinion (Erikson,
Stimson, and MacKuen 2002; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erik-
son 1995; Wlezien 1996) and the public’s responsiveness to policymaking by Congress and
the President (Erikson, Stimson, and MacKuen 2002). Yet, their application to the study
of public responsiveness to the Supreme Court, or the judiciary more generally, has been
highly limited. Again, the Supreme Court’s power to make policy by overturning and
interpreting acts of Congress and the state legislatures represents a potentially powerful
ability to affect the public’s relative policy preferences.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence of negative feedback from judicial decision-making
in public opinion. Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) find that the direction of federal
courts’ decision-making has a negative relationship with public opinion on several issues.
They conclude that, “When their [the federal courts’] statements and actions push in one
1This hypothetical reflects the political reality surrounding the Court. Consider Lawrence v. Texas
(2003), in which the Supreme Court struck down state laws that banned homosexual sodomy. Existing
evidence against the legitimation hypothesis suggests that the Court’s decision was unlikely to engender
greater support for gay rights at either the individual or aggregate levels. However, the decision amounted
to a major practical and symbolic change in policy on the treatment of homosexuals. Thus, a person
with a moderate absolute preference on gay rights may have expressed a relative preference for more
expansive gay rights before the decision and for less expansive gay right afterwards. Aggregating across
individuals, relative preference change of this type would produce a reduction in macro support for more
expansive gay rights. This type of effect might have important political implications, such as shifting
marginal support toward a political party that advocated a more narrow scope of gay rights. In any
event, while the Court failed to legitimize policy attitudes, i.e. change absolute preferences, it may still
have a politically relevant effect on relative public opinion.
7direction. . . public opinion tends to move in the opposite direction” (1987, p. 32). These
findings contradict the authors’ priors, derived from the legitimation hypothesis. Ratio-
nalizing these results, they explain that, “the federal courts served as negative referents
in the 1970’s and early 1980’s because of their unpopular actions on such issues as busing
and capital punishment” (1987, p. 32).2
In keeping with Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey, Wlezien and Goggin (1993) find that
public opinion in support of abortion policy “as it is now” increased during the 1980s as
the Supreme Court permitted states to regulate abortion more strictly during the course of
that decade. Contrary to the explanation of Page and his coauthors, Wlezien and Goggin
attribute their findings to a thermostatic model of public opinion. Wlezien and Goggin
conclude that the public processed information about the Court’s decisions through the
media and subsequently exhibited changed relative preferences about abortion as the
status quo policy changed.
Along these lines, Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht (2000) find a thermostatic-like rela-
tionship between the public’s support for the Supreme Court and the level of consonance
between liberalism in Supreme Court decision-making and public opinion liberalism. As
the ideological divergence between the Court’s policymaking activities and the public’s
preferences for the direction of policymaking grows, Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht argue
that support for the Court falls. The authors conclude, “despite the supposed impercep-
tibility of the Court, the research suggests that in some way, the public perceives. . . and
evaluates the Court” (p. 775).
Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) and Wlezien and Goggin’s (1992) research in-
dicates that their is negative feedback from Supreme Court decision-making in public
opinion on a number of unique issues. Durr, Martin, and Wolbrect (2000) show that
2While their results are not inconsistent with their speculation about the judiciary’s role as a polit-
ical reference point, the results Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) report are equally supportive of a
thermostatic model of public opinion.
8the public translates information about the ideological divergence of the Supreme Court’s
policymaking activities from its preferred course into a dynamic evaluation of the Court.
Taken with previous evidence of general ideological responsiveness in public opinion to
policymaking by other institutions of national government (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen and
Stimson 2002), these results indicate that the public may produce a general thermostatic
response to judicial policymaking. Specifically, as the Supreme Court moves the status
quo policy in one ideological direction, the proportion of the public that prefers future
policy changes in the opposite direction should grow.
1.3 Modeling Public Reaction to Supreme Court De-
cisions
Through this theoretical framework, it is straightforward to model the effects of Supreme
Court decisions on aggregate public opinion, controlling for other factors that may influ-
ence public sentiment. First though, it is critical to define public opinion conceptually
and to attach a metric of public sentiment to that concept. Fortunately, James Stimson’s
(1999) study of American public opinion provides guidance on these points, and I draw
on his work here.
Stimson defines a general concept of public policy mood, or Mood, for short: “It con-
notes shared feelings that move [together] over time and circumstance. . . [M]ood here
captures the idea of changing general dispositions”(1999, 20). He uses this conceptual
definition as the starting point to develop a measure of Mood. Stimson’s Mood measure
is generated from more than 100 unique national survey items asked in identical form in
two or more years from the mid-1950’s through the present. Stimson codes responses to
each item as liberal or conservative and statistically extracts the common dimensional
variance across aggregated responses to every item. This produces a macro level measure
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Figure 1.2: Policy Mood and Spaeth % Liberal (All Cases): 1954 to 1996
of relative opinion liberalism in the American mass public. Stimson (1999; see also Erik-
son, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) interprets Mood as the public’s preference for more or
less government—that is, more or less policy liberalism. The estimated Mood index is
scored such that higher values correspond to greater relative liberalism.
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s (2002) extensive study of the relationship between
public opinion and public policy points to numerous causal influences on Mood, each of
which represents an important control for modeling the Supreme Court’s influence on
public opinion. Erikson and his colleagues find that acts of Congress and macroeconomic
conditions produce movement in Mood consistent with a thermostatic model of public
opinion. They show that there is negative feedback in public opinion from public policy,
measured discretely as the net number of important liberal laws (Laws) using Mayhew’s
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(1991) list of important legislation.3 As Congress creates more conservative public pol-
icy (Policy)4, the country exhibits increased liberalism, and vice versa. Likewise, they
find that Americans demonstrate increased conservatism as inflation (Inflation) rises and
increased liberalism with rising unemployment (Unemployment).
Incorporating Supreme Court decision-making into this model creates a test of the
public’s ability to respond thermostatically to changes in judicial policy-making: Supreme
Court decisions (or patterns of Supreme Court decision-making) should produce negative
feedback in Mood in-keeping with a thermostatic model of public opinion. In other words,
liberal Supreme Court decisions should produce conservative movement in Mood, and
conservative decisions should produce liberal movement. This conjecture can be subjected
to empirical scrutiny.
The thermostatic theory of public opinion advanced here suggests that the value of
Mood is set by the public’s relative preferences for changes in public policy given the
macroeconomy and the current state of public policy—whether that policy has emanated
from the judiciary or from another institution of governmeny. To the extent that collec-
tive judgements about the economy and policy as well as collective expectations about
the consequences of policy choices are accurate, Mood should adjust quickly to changes
in the political or economic status quo. Of course, there is reason to suspect that this
may not be the case. It is likely that some information will take longer to filter into the
political system and that the implementation of public policy will not always meet the
public’s expectations. Moreover, information about the effects of public policy changes
3Mayhew (1991) identifies important legislation in two sweeps. The first sweep includes legislation
viewed as important at the time of its passage. The second sweep includes legislation viewed as important
some time after passage. Like Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002), I exclude legislation collected in
the second sweep. This list was extended through 1996 by Jay Greene (reported in Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002).
4Policy is constructed by aggregating the detrended value of Laws over time, beginning, arbitrarily,
at zero.
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and changes in economic conditions may not spread through the public equally or instan-
taneously. As such, some of the influence of changes in public policy or the macroeconomy
on Mood should be effective in the short run, while the full impact of a policy change, for
example, may appear only in the long run.
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). At the time
of the decision, many conservative commentators argued that Lawrence would serve as
the basis for undoing state laws which criminalized or regulated other consensual sexual
activity, including prostitution. A citizen observing the decision and the commentary
might reasonably have believed that Lawrence represented a major change in constitu-
tional law which would generally abridge or forbid state regulation of some licentious
activities. However, several federal and state courts have since rejected these arguments,
construing the Court’s decision in Lawrence narrowly. Seeing this application, or at least
observing the continued enforcement of laws against prostitution, a citizen might update
her beliefs about the location of the policy status quo created by the decision in Lawrence.
Collectively, reactions along these lines should produce a conservative movement in public
opinion in the short term and a corrective movement in a liberal direction in the long run.
Complex dynamics may also be present in cases where the import of a policy change
is not felt immediately. Consider the Patriot Act, which passed the Congress with broad,
bipartisan support following September 11. Yet, many have subsequently argued that the
law has been applied too aggressively by the Bush administration. The passage of the
Patriot Act, a conservative proposal, should have produced an initial liberal movement
in Mood. This shift should have been complemented with additional increase in public
opinion liberalism as it became clear that the law would be applied strictly and vigorously.
Patterns of casual flow from Supreme Court decision-making, congressional policy, and
macroeconomic conditions such as these suggest that a simple dynamic regression model
of public opinion liberalism may be inadequate. To capture the potential for short run
and long run influences flowing from political events to public opinion, I employ a series
12
of single equation error correction models (ECM) of Mood to operationalize the empirical
analysis of the thermostatic theory advanced above.5
This is not a traditional application of an ECM, which is typically reserved for the
analysis of cointegrated relationships. Yet, established analytical results and recent em-
pirical work indicate that this is an appropriate model specification with which to assess
the potentially complex dynamic relationships between public opinion and Supreme Court
decision-making.
The Bardsen (1989) single equation ECM, which I employ in these analyses, is an
alternative parameterization of the autoregressive distributed lag model (ADL). The ADL
takes the bivariate form:
Yt = α0 + α1Yt−1 + β0Xt + β1Xt−1 + ²t (1.1)
The notation ADL(p, q) identifies the number of lags of the dependent variable (p) and
the number of lags of the independent variable (q). It can be proven that the single
equation ECM is a special case of the ADL(1, 1) (Bannerjee et al 1993; Davidson and
MacKinnon 1993; DeBoef and Keele 2005). The Bardsen ECM differs from the ADL in
that an error correction parameter as well as estimates of short run and long run effects
appear directly in the model. In the bivariate case, the Bardsen ECM takes the form:
∆Yt = α0 + α
∗
1Yt−1 + β
∗
1∆Xt + β
∗
2Xt−1 + ²t, (1.2)
where α1 indicates the speed of the reiquilibration of Y to a deviation from its equilib-
rium with X, β2 reflects the long run effect of changes in X on Y , and β1 indicates the
contemporaneous relationship between a change in X and a change in Y (Davidson and
MacKinnon 1993; DeBoef and Keele 2005). DeBoef and Keele (2005) also note that, since
5Volume 4 of Political Analysis, published in 1993, contains an excellent series of introductory articles
on error correction models (Beck 1993; Durr 1993a, 1993b; Smith 1993; Williams 1993).
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the dependent variable of the Bardsen ECM is differenced, any danger of estimating a
spurious regression with near integrated data is eliminated. In addition to these attrac-
tive analytic properties, Monte Carlo experiments indicate that the ECM implemented
through OLS capably recovers the data generating process even in small samples (De-
Boef and Keele 2005). In short, the ECM stands out as a useful and powerful model
specification for testing dynamic relationships in time series data.
Both the analytic and empirical results support the use of an ECM to examine complex
dynamic relationships generally, but there is additional theoretical justification in this
case. The thermostatic theory of Mood advanced by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
(2002) and others implies an equilibrium, supply and demand-like relationship between
government activity and public opinion. Mood reflects the public’s relative demand for
more or less policy liberalism from the government. If the economy stood still and policy
remained constant, Mood should maintain a steady value over time, a value determined
by the distance between the public’s aggregated absolute preferences for policymaking
and the status quo. If the government were to disturb this steady state, by producing a
single new liberal policy, a simple thermostatic theory of public opinion liberalism would
predict a contemporaneous conservative change in Mood indicating the extent to which
some individuals in the mass public had become satisfied or dissatisfied with the new
policy.
Yet, it is clear that, in the real world, the effects of a policy change are not imme-
diately evident nor even predictable. Thus, it would also be reasonable to expect that
addition information about the policy change would flow into the public as additional
time passes. Uncertainty of this variety may be especially important when the Supreme
Court is involved, as the implementation of decisions may occur with long and variable
lags (Rosenberg 1991). This would produce some additional movement in Mood in the
long run. As I discussed in more detail above, this sort of complex dynamic relationship
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may well play out between the public and the Supreme Court. Thus, the analytical prob-
lem of assessing the hypothesized relationships—and determining whether they exist as
instantaneous adjustments, long run equilibrations, both, or neither—strongly suggests
the use of an ECM.
I conduct and present this analysis in two stages. First, treating Supreme Court
decisions as discrete events, I develop and estimate two single equation error correction
models of Mood from 1954 to 1996 as a function of the macro economy (Changes in
Unemployment and Inflation.),6 public policy (defined as Laws and Policy),7 and the
annual net number of liberal salient Supreme Court decisions (Figure 1.3)8. Following
Epstein and Segal (2000), I define salient cases as those for which the decision is mentioned
on the front page of The New York Times. This measurement approach will capture
the effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions that are most readily available for mass
consumption through the media, rather than the decisions of the uncensored Court. The
salient cases time series has a maximum value of 26, produced in 1964, and a minimum
value of -8, reached in 1989. The mean of the series is 3.14.
In the second stage, I estimate the same model using alternative measures of the
Supreme Court decision-making: the proportion of all Supreme Court decisions decided
in a liberal direction annually, the proportion of salient Supreme Court decisions decided
in a liberal direction annually, the proportion of all cases in which the Court found for
the appellate decided in a liberal direction, and Martin and Quinn’s (2002) ideal point
6Here, Unemployment and Inflation are annual national unemployment rates and the U.S. Consumer
Price Index, respectively, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2003).
7The fist difference of Policy is, by definition, exactly equal to the number of Laws created in the
previous time period, i.e. ∆Policyt = Lawst−1. To resolve the emergent collinearity issue, I do not
model a long run effect for Laws.
8Ideological coding for case outcomes are drawn from Spaeth’s (2004) United States Supreme Court
Database.
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estimates for the median justice on the Court (Figure 1.4).9,10 One should note that three
of these measurement approaches operationalize the Supreme Court decisions directly,
rather than through the filter of media presentation. These operationalized measures
imply a more robust flow of information about the Court reaching the public. However,
a cursory visual inspection reveals, all of these series correlate very highly (bivariate
correlations from 0.54 to 0.90). Yet, there are several years where one or another metric
of Court liberalism varies highly from the others. Thus, testing the model under various
measurement specification is important.
1.4 Results and Analysis
The results indicate that Supreme Court decision-making (measured as salient, liberal
decisions) has a significant, negative effect on public opinion liberalism (Table 1.1). In
other words, the data indicate that there is negative feedback from Supreme Court de-
cisions to public opinion consistent with a thermostatic model of public opinion. These
effects occur both in the short run and in the long run.
In this specification, each additional salient liberal decision produces a conservative
movement in Mood of -0.15 points in the short run, while producing an additional long
9Scholars of judicial decision-making typically distinguish between Supreme Court decision-making
in different issue areas, such as criminal procedure, civil rights, and economic regulation. This choice
reflects a theoretical proposition that substantively different areas of law may be governed by different
decision-making processes. This may be the case, but, in terms of actual case outcomes—the policy
products consumed by the public and other political actors—there is a strong, unidimensional structure
to aggregate patterns of Supreme Court decision-making. For example, time series of the proportion
of cases decided in a liberal direction among all criminal procedure, civil rights, and economics cases,
using Spaeth’s (2004) issue coding, correlate at 0.70 or better. Moreover, a simple principal components
analysis reveals that a single component, with an Eigenvalue of 2.43, explains more that 80% of the
variance in the three series (See also Martin and Quinn 2002). Whatever causal regime may influence
Supreme Court decision-making in a given issue area, it appears that the Court’s policy outputs may be
reasonably well represented by a single dimension. As such, I employ aggregate measures of the Supreme
Court’s liberalism on a single, left-right ideological dimension here.
10The Martin and Quinn (2004) ideal point estimates were recoded to be bounded between 0 and 1
and such that higher values indicated greater liberalism.
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run movement of -0.15 during the following years. The long run effect filters into Mood
at a rate determined by the coefficient on the first lag of the undifferenced dependent
variable, in this case -0.48. This means that approximately half of the long run movement
of Mood to its new equilibrium value will occur at time point t + 1, and that half of the
remainder will occur at t + 2, and so on. Asymptotically, the total long run effect of an
additional, liberal Supreme Court decision is -0.15.11 Thus, an additional salient, liberal
decision has, functionally, two effects on public Mood, one that is instantaneous (within
the same year) and another which filters into public opinion gradually as the decision
is implemented and becomes the object of political debate. Considering the mean value
of the salient cases time series is just over 3, a typical year’s Supreme Court decisions
produce a short run conservative movement in Mood of roughly the same magnitude as a
point increase in Inflation and an additional long-run effect of the same magnitude.
At the extremes, the model predicts that the Supreme Court caused a short run
movement of -3.9 points in Mood in 1964, when the Court produced 26 net liberal salient
decisions, and a liberal movement of 1.2 points in 1989 when the Court produced 8 net
conservative salient decisions. The short run predicted effect in 1964 is roughly equal
to the predicted effect a 8% increase in Inflation or a 3% decrease in Unemployment,
respectively. The long run, equilibrium effect of Supreme Court decision-making in the
years following these extreme values are predicted to be roughly the same magnitude.
Additionally, the parameter estimates confirm the expected effects of macroeconomic
conditions on public opinion. Unemployment has significant causal influence on Mood
in the short term, indicating that the public quickly assimilates information about the
changing condition of the economy. Conversely, Inflation’s political influence manifests
itself in the long run. Growing Unemployment produces liberal movement in Mood ;
increased Inflation produces conservative movement in public opinion.
11Given the error correction parameter estimate of -0.48, roughly 90% of the long run effects of Supreme
Court decision-making should be in place in 5 years.
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Table 1.1: ∆ Moodt as a Function of Supreme Court Liberalism
Predictors Effects
Long Run Effects
Moodt−1 -0.48***
(0.09)
Inflationt−1 -0.54***
(0.20)
Unemploymentt−1 0.07
(0.32)
Policyt−1 -0.17**
(0.06)
Lawst−1 -0.38**
(0.15)
Supreme Court Liberalismt−1 –0.15***
(0.06)
Short Run Effects
∆Inflationt -0.26
(0.20)
∆Unemploymentt 1.27***
(0.45)
∆Policyt 0.25
(0.18)
∆Supreme Court Liberalismt -0.15**
(0.05)
Constant 32.63***
(5.95)
R2 0.63
N 42
Note: OLS Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Laws also have a sharp long run effect on public opinion. Each additional piece of
important liberal legislation produced by Congress yields a negative change in Mood of
0.38. Likewise, Policy, on produces a significant, long run change in Mood in a direction
supportive of the thermostatic model. These findings indicate that public policy changes
have powerful effects on public opinion liberalism, consistent with previous research in this
field (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). Finally, the fit of the model is satisfactory;
the R2 of Model 1 is 0.63.
These results also hold substantively across different metrics of Supreme Court liber-
alism. Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 share the same structure as Model 1, but they are estimated
with alternative measures of the macro policy outputs of the Court. Model 2 represents
Supreme Court liberalism as the proportion of all orally argued cases decided in a liberal
direction in each year. Model 3 utilizes the proportion of all cases in which the Court
found for the petitioning party decided in a liberal direction. This measure takes into ac-
count the strategic thinking of appellants approaching the Court, who do generally seek a
hearing they expect to lose (McGuire and Stimson 2004). Model 4 follows Durr, Martin,
and Wolbrecht (2000) by measuring Supreme Court liberalism as proportion of salient
Supreme Court cases decided in a liberal direction in each year. Finally, Model 5 uses
Martin and Quinn’s (2002) ideal point estimates for the median justice on the Court.12
The results are presented in Table 1.2.
The estimates produced by these models are substantively identical to those produced
by Model 1 and hold for both the direct and indirect (media filtered) measures of Supreme
Court liberalism. The coefficients of the Supreme Court variables are also very similar
in these four models, though this is not surprising given the high correlation between the
Supreme Court liberalism time series. In all cases, Supreme Court liberalism maintains its
significant, negative relationship with public opinion liberalism. As the Court becomes
12These ideal point estimates are calculated by Supreme Court term, not by calendar year. Thus, these
figures are on an eccentric calendar with respect to the other measures.
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more liberal, Mood indicates greater conservatism. Also, the estimates for the macro-
economic and policy variables are very similar across these models and to the estimates
produced using the salient cases series. The overall fit of these models remains high. The
R2s for these models range from 0.58 to 0.62.13 Figure 1 overlays the most parsimonious
of these proportional metrics, the proportion of all orally argued cases decided in a liberal
direction, with the Mood time series.
1.5 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
Here, I have asked, Does the mass public react systematically to Supreme Court decision-
making? The data indicate that it does.
Utilizing various measures of Supreme Court liberalism, the data consistently indi-
cate a dynamic relationship between Supreme Court decision-making and public opinion.
The relationship takes the form of negative feedback: increased Supreme Court liberalism
produces mass conservatism and vice versa. This finding holds across models estimated us-
ing media related indicators of Supreme Court liberalism and direct measures of Supreme
Court policymaking. Moreover, the size of these effects are of the same order of magnitude
as the predicted effects of important macroeconomic changes and legislative policymaking
on public opinion liberalism. These results suggest that the Supreme Court occupies a
larger place in the public’s understanding of politics than has been previously thought.
These results should not be taken to mean that Supreme Court decision-making is
important to all individuals at all times. The models predict mass opinion change of
approximately 5 to 10 points inMood resulting from the observed range of Supreme Court
decision-making, depending on the measure employed. While the absolute magnitude of
this marginal effect is modest, the relative magnitude of public responsiveness to Supreme
13Simple LDV regression models ofMood produce substantially similar results. Supreme Court decision-
making has a sizeable effect on public opinion in a direction consistent with the causal theory advanced
here.
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Table 1.2: ∆ Moodt as a Function of Supreme Court Liberalism (Various Metrics)
Supreme Court Liberalism Metrics
Predictors Prop. Lib. All Prop. Lib. Rev. Prop. Lib. Salient M&Q Score
Long Run Effects
Moodt−1 -0.50*** -0.48*** -0.56*** -0.49***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Inflationt−1 -0.55** -0.65*** -0.63*** -0.38
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23)
Unemploymentt−1 -0.22 -0.33 0.07 -0.05
(0.39) (.43) (0.32) (0.34)
Policyt−1 -0.20** -0.17** -0.17*** -0.16**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Lawst−1 -0.35** -0.38** -0.38** -0.38**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Supreme Court Liberalismt−1 -11.55** -7.78** -7.17*** -3.56**
(4.60) (3.26) (2.48) (1.47)
Short Run Effects
∆Inflationt -0.29 -0.40* -0.35* -0.25*
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
∆Unemploymentt 1.02** 1.08** 1.27*** 0.89*
(0.48) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49)
∆Policyt 0.232 0.18 0.24 0.36
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
∆Supreme Court Liberalismt -9.15* -10.55** -5.85*** -2.91
(4.62) (4.22) (1.91) (2.10)
Constant 40.87*** 39.42*** 41.84*** 32.85***
(7.66) (7.39) (5.95) (6.63)
R2 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.58
N 42 42 42 42
Note: OLS Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Court decision-making is surprisingly large; it is easily on par with public reactions to
congressional policymaking and important macroeconomic changes. In sum, an attentive
subset of Americans react systematically to Supreme Court decision-making and this
reaction is sufficient to produce a sizeable, significant, and negative response to the Court
in the public’s relative preferences for future policymaking.
These results raise raise questions with respect to electoral politics. Mass opinion
shifts of the size predicted in these models by Supreme Court policymaking may have
implications for the outcomes of elections. Yet, since the Court is itself an unelected
institution, the public has no way to directly influence the judiciary; it’s political response
to Supreme Court decision-making must flow through the electoral process. This suggests
that Supreme Court decision-making may have interesting effects for American national
elections which might be limned, for example, by the prominence of the issue of Supreme
Court nominations in recent presidential elections. Obviously, though, this speculation
should be explored with future research.
More broadly, these results speak to a larger issue of the substantive role of the Court
in the American political system. Democracy implies a reciprocal relationship between the
governed and the government. Government must be responsive to the will of the public;
the public must be aware of and responsive to the activities of the government. Much of
the scientific study of American politics is geared, directly or indirectly, to assessing the
quality of one of these two implied relationships. Taken with results that indicate that the
Supreme Court, or at least a subset of its members, responds positively to public opinion
on a liberal-conservative dimension (McGuire and Stimson 2004; Mishler and Sheehan
1993), this evidence of negative feedback from judicial policymaking in relative public
opinion liberalism may indicate a cybernetic relationship—a closed “feedback loop”—
between public opinion and the Court, much like the demonstrated reciprocal relationships
between the elected branches of government and the mass public (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002). Again, this issue deserves additional attention by scholars.
Chapter 2
“If We Are Wrong. . . The Courts
Will Correct It”: Legislative Voting
under Judicial Review
Scholars of the legislative process and interinstitutional relationships have increasingly
recognized the strategic concerns that the anticipation of judicial review may create for
legislators. Indeed, judicial review provides numerous opportunities for strategic inter-
actions between courts and legislatures.1 The most simple of these evolve from the veto
player tradition (e.g. Tsebelis 2001), in which legislatures are thought to regard courts as
obstacles which must be avoided in the policy-making process (Volcansek 2001). Marks
(1989) offers an account of Congress’s inability to pass new legislation overturning Grove
City College v. Bell. And, Pickerill (2004) assesses the extent to which members of
Congress shape legislation in anticipation of judicial review, concluding: the “threat of
judicial review. . . [is] analogous to veto threats communicated to Congress by presidents”
(p. 68).
1Despite the pioneering nature of Brian Marks (1989) account of Congress’s inability to overturn
Grove City College v. Bell (1984), most “separation of powers” models have focussed on the limits that
legislatures impose on courts (Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Martin 2001; Spiller and Gely 1992; but see
Segal 1997).
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Veto player models certainly capture an important dynamic in legislative-judicial re-
lations. But, in an important sense, these models are limited by the narrow view of the
politics of legislative-judicial relations. While courts are often roadblock to policy change,
policymakers may employ courts to advance a number of policy and political objectives
they could not achieve in the absence of judicial review. More broadly, we might ask:
How do legislatures and legislators use judicial review to serve some political purpose?
Political scientists and scholars of public law have offered a number of answers to this
question in both comparative and American contexts. For example, Vanberg (1998) shows
how judicial review can be used as a tool of legislative coalition building in systems where
constitutional challenges must originate in the legislature. Helmke (2002) illustrates how
strong governments (dictatorial and democratic) in developing political systems use judi-
cial review to legitimize policy choices, which in turn yields strategic defections by courts
when governments weaken. In the American case, Rogers (2001) argues that legislatures
may make use of “informational judicial review” to ensure that policy is enacted as in-
tended. Whittington (2005) argues that, “elected officials may actively seek to turn over
controversial political questions to the courts” (p.592; See also Graber 1993).
In important respects, the claims of Rogers, Whittington, and others advancing simi-
lar arguments about congressional interactions with the Supreme Court have resurrected
James Bradley Thayer’s (1893) classic critique of judicial review. Thayer argues that ju-
dicial review ameliorates the serious consideration of constitutional issues by a legislature
since they may delegate that function to the judiciary. He writes, “No doubt our doctrine
of constitutional law has had a tendency to drive out questions of justice and right. . . [I]f
we [legislators] are wrong. . . the courts will correct it” (pp. 155-56).2
2Thayer’s perspective, judicial review serves interests of politicians by providing them with a chance to
take a popular action that employs the judiciary as a “backstop” to protect their privately preferred policy
outcomes. Thayer’s claim echoes in contemporary writings over the role of judicial review and claims of
“popular constitutionalism” (e.g. Kramer 2004) and parallels important relatively recent developments in
the study of presidential decision-making which examine the balance struck by presidents cross-pressured
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This paper refines, expands, and offers some empirical support for Thayer’s argument.
I explore this issue employing decision theoretic models of legislative voting.3 The models
show that as the probability that a court will annul popular legislation increases, a pro-
posal is likely to garner growing support in a legislature. This dynamic emerges as the
institution of judicial review creates opportunities for legislators to vote on proposals with
diminished expected policy consequences—that is, policy consequences discounted by the
probability that a constitutional court will annul them. I test this prediction through
comparative analyses of congressional votes surrounding the issue of flag burning in 1989
and 1990. I conclude that judicial review transforms the incentives facing legislative ac-
tors, leading to a legislative decision-making that may privilege political expediency over
“questions of justice and right.”
2.1 Thayer and the Political Consequences of Judi-
cial Review
The bulk of Thayer’s 1893 essay, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law,” is a case for extreme judicial restraint. He argues that, though ju-
dicial review is a legitimate component in American constitutionalism, legislatures have
an independent ability to interpret the constitutionality of their own actions and that
a judgment that legislation is constitutional is implicit in the decision to enact a law.
Because of the close relationship between representatives and their constituents—the sov-
ereign People—courts owe much deference to those judgments about the constitutionality
between their constituents’ preferences and their private judgments, information, and interests (Canes-
Wrone, Herron, and Schotts 2001; Canes-Wrone and Schotts 2004; Groseclose and McCarty 2000).
3While the following discussion and models are applicable to almost any elected policymaker who
interacts with constitutional review, the special relevance of position-taking interests to members of the
United States Congress (Mayhew 1974) makes the legislative case an appealing starting point for modeling
the complex interactions between elected policymakers, public opinion, and courts.
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of legislation. Thus, Thayer argues, courts should adopt a “reasonable doubt” standard
for overturning legislative actions: laws should be allowed to stand unless there can be no
reasonable doubt that they are unconstitutional.
Like many advocates of judicial restraint before and since, Thayer bemoaned his con-
temporary judiciary’s tendency to step beyond its appropriate role in the American con-
stitutional system. But, his commentary did not stop with a plea for courts to cease and
desist in aggressive judicial review. Thayer concluded his essay by outlining some polit-
ical consequences he expected to flow from courts overstepping their bounds. Thus, his
critique of judicial review is tied to a critique of legislative decision-making under judicial
review. Tushnet distills Thayer’s key point:
[B]ecause legislatures have mistakenly come to rely on judicial review to
correct their “legal” errors, and have abandoned concern for “questions of jus-
tice and right,” they actually make such [constitutional] judgments less often
than they should. Further, even if legislatures make constitutional determi-
nations, many times their decisions will not be reviewed by the courts. . . [or]
courts may turn out to be “broken reeds,” failing to exercise their powers of
judicial review appropriately (1993, p. 24.)
The danger of emaciated legislative judgment is two-fold: the implementation of uncon-
stitutional policies and the erosion of independent constitutional judgment in legislatures.
Unfortunately, Thayer’s brief conjecture about the nature of legislative decision-making
under judicial review is just that: brief conjecture. He does not offer any specifics about
what mechanisms might cause legislatures to pass final authority over important policy
questions onto courts, and he does not offer any evidence to support his speculation.
While legal scholars have and will continue to spill vats of ink arguing about the proper
degree of deference due legislative choices in constitutional courts, political scientists are
uniquely suited to evaluate Thayer’s claims about the political consequences of judicial
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review. Our rich literature on legislative decision-making offers powerful theoretical tools
to begin to explore the dynamics that might emerge in a Thayerian legislature.4 In
the following sections, I explore the dynamics of legislative decision-making under judi-
cial review, by offering a simple model of legislative decisions that emerges readily from
the congressional literature, then complicating the model by introducing the element of
constitutional review by an independent court. Briefly, the models show how judicial
review may cause an important change in the relative weights legislators attach to to
position-taking considerations—political expediency—versus policy concerns—“questions
of justice and right.”
2.2 Legislative Decision-Making
Legislators generally, and members of Congress in particular, pursue a variety of goals,
including securing reelection, changing public policy, gaining authority in their, and,
perhaps, seeking higher office (Fenno 1973). Nevertheless, David Mayhew’s (1974) simple
observation that, for members of Congress, “[r]eelection underlies everything else” (p. 16),
rings true. This formulation was suggested even earlier in the work of Anthony Downs
(1957) in the context of party behavior, “Since none of the appurtenances of office can be
obtained without being elected, the main goal of every party is the winning of elections.
Thus, all its actions are aimed at maximizing votes, and it treats policies merely as
means towards this end” (p. 35). Conceptualizing legislators as “single-minded seekers of
reelection” (Mayhew 1974, p. 17) has led to tremendous insight into a variety important
phenomena and behaviors.
For present purposes, the most important consequence of this electoral connection is
4Not all legal scholars who take up Thayer’s critique of judicial review in context of legislative decision-
making ignore political science scholarship on legislative behavior. In particular, Garrett and Vermeule
(2001) propose a set congressional procedural reforms as remedies for the deficiencies of the “Thayerian
Congress,” which they develop out of assumptions about legislative behavior grounded in empirical studies
of Congress.
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the implication that a legislator is constrained in her ability to act on preferences that
do not match those of her constituency. In the case of the United States Congress, this
hypothesis has found at least two strong pieces of supporting evidence. First, members
of Congress are held electorally accountable by their constituents for moving “out of
step” with their district’s preferences (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-
Wrone et al 2002; Erikson 1971; Erikson and Wright 2000). Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, decades of interviews with members of Congress indicate that these men
and women are deeply concerned with reelection and that they actively believe that
their voting records affect their chances of reelection (See e.g. Clausen 1973; Fenno
1978; Kingdon 1989; Matthews and Stimson 1975). As Morris Fiorina comments, “No
close observer of Congress can doubt that members are highly attuned to the electoral
consequences of their actions” (1989, p. 103). This indicates that members of Congress
are especially attuned to the electoral consequences of their roll call votes, which are
permanent and public records of their actions to change or protect policy.
Nevertheless, there are many circumstances under which legislators might hold per-
sonal policy preferences that diverge from those of their constituents. New issues might
emerge. Issues that had previously been unimportant achieve new salience. Legislators
may have private information about which policy is most likely to produce favorable re-
sults. Or, as the Founders may have suspected, legislators, in their capacity as elites, may
have a sufficiently different world-view from ordinary citizens that they become out of step
with their constituents. Under these or other conditions where legislators might hold per-
sonal views that diverge from their constituents’ preferences, strategic officeholders must
balance the position taking and policymaking costs and benefits of their votes. These
cross-pressured legislators are the object of this inquiry and the motor of the Thayerian
legislature.
Thus, in deciding how to vote on legislation, legislators must balance at least two
competing considerations. They must consider the political consequences of their votes
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as well as the policy effects of legislation. In other words, when members of a legislature
consider their vote choices, they balance the position taking value of their vote against
the value of policy change resulting from that vote. As the popularity of a proposal, or as
an individual legislator’s valuation of the popularity of a proposal, increases so does the
position taking value of supporting the proposal. Likewise, as the position of a proposal
approaches the ideal point of a legislator in a policy space, the policy value of supporting
the legislation also increases.
These decision-making elements facing members of Congress, and legislators generally,
can be captured in a decision theoretical model of decision-making that I call the simple
legislative choice. In the simple legislative choice, legislators face a decision between some
proposal (P ) that changes public policy and that is associated with some utility from
position taking and the status quo (∼ P ).5 More formally, the considerations of the
simple legislative choice are:
xi = Utility from Policy Change; xi ∈ < (2.1)
y = Utility from Position Taking; y ∈ < (2.2)
αi = Individual Position Taking Parameter; α ∈ (0, 1) (2.3)
Thus, under any legislative decision rule, the utilities to a pivotal legislator for choosing
P or ∼ P are, respectively:
Up(P ) = xp + αpy (2.4)
Up(∼ P ) = 0 (2.5)
This choice is represented in Figure 1.6
5I assume that passed proposals are fully implemented.
6Quantities indicate the utility to the pivotal legislator.
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Figure 2.1: Simple Legislative Choice
In a state of the world without judicial review, which might be analogous to a parlia-
mentary vote in a Westminster system or a vote on a constitutional amendment in the
American context, these considerations are the only factors that legislators need to incor-
porate into their decision calculus over a legislative choice. This state implies a decision
rule; a pivotal legislator should choose P if:
xp + αpy ≥ 0 (2.6)
In terms of the pivotal legislator’s policy preferences, the model implies that she should
choose P if:
xp ≥ −αpy (2.7)
Thus, when y > 0 and α > 0, the model predicts a circumstance under which a legislator
would support a legislative proposal even for some negative values of x. In other words,
a legislator might rationally choose to support a proposal that violates her private policy
preferences if the position taking gains associated with that support are sufficiently large.7
7Obviously, the inverse is true as well. The model equally predicts that legislators may be willing
to accept negative utility for position taking (supporting unpopular legislation) if the gains from policy
associated with a particular proposal are sufficiently large. Accepting a policy loss to gain from position
taking is usually referred to as pandering; ignoring a proposal’s unpopularity to support it is a “Profile
in Courage.” Regardless, this particular implication of the model is not addressed here.
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2.3 The Legislative Choice under Judicial Review
Now, consider the legislature’s decision calculus under an institution of constitutional
review by an independent judiciary. The institution of judicial review forces legislators to
subject their consideration of a proposal to an expected utility calculation with respect
to the probability that a court will annul a passed proposal. Considering the case of the
pivotal legislative voter, if a court upholds legislation, (U), her payoff from supporting
legislation remains identical to supporting legislation under the simple legislative choice.
If the court annuls the legislation (∼ U) however, the legislator’s utility from policy change
is attenuated, while her gains from position taking remain intact.8
Treating the court’s decision to annul or uphold legislation as a random process such
that it will uphold legislation with some known probability,9 the additional considerations
of the legislative choice under judicial review can be formalized as:
λ = Policy Implementation Parameter; λ ∈ [0, 1], (2.8)
p = Pr(U), (2.9)
(1− p) = Pr(∼ U) (2.10)
8The limited enactment of legislation that may precede judicial review is not necessarily trivial. For
example, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 created a federal civil cause of action for women
who were the target of violence motivated by their gender. This provision was struck down by the
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Morrison (2000). Prior to the Court’s decision, at least twelve civil claims
were filed and pursued in federal district courts (Masters 1999). These actions encumbered respondents
with expenses and provided a basis for those who might have been influenced by the law to observe its
enforcement. Also, legislation may have symbolic value. In the case of the Violence Against Women Act,
the Supreme Court’s annulment of the legislation’s civil liability provision may not have detracted from
the symbolic value of Congress addressing the incidence of violence aimed at women. Judicial annulment
of legislation therefore limits, but does not necessarily remove, the policy effects of legislation. As such, I
represent the policymaking considerations in the history (Pass, Annul) as a parametrization, rather than
an elimination, of the policymaking utility of a proposal.
9Obviously, courts do not uphold or annul legislation by some stochastic process. However, this
representation of judicial review is reasonable from the perspective of analyzing legislative behavior.
Since legislators cannot know for certain how a court will react to legislation, they must act on some
probabilistic prior belief about the likelihood a statute will be annulled. As such, the model maps
reasonably well onto the actual decision calculus of legislators operating under judicial review.
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Thus, under any legislative decision rule, the utilities to a pivotal legislator for choosing
P or ∼ P are, respectively:
Up(P ) = p(xp + αpy) + (1− p)(λxp + αpy) (2.11)
Up(∼ P ) = 0 (2.12)
This choice is represented in Figure 2.10
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Figure 2.2: Legislative Choice under Judicial Review
Again, this situation implies a decision rule for a pivotal legislator; choose P if:
p(xp + αpy) + (1− p)(λxp + αpy) ≥ 0 (2.13)
And, in terms of her policy preferences, this reduces to a choice of P if:
xp ≥ −αp y
p(1− λ) + λ (2.14)
Like the simple legislative choice, the decision model predicts that a legislator would
support a proposal even for some negative values of x when y > 0 and α > 0. And,
10Quantities indicate the utility to the pivotal legislator.
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because p ∈ [0, 1] and λ ∈ [0, 1] the model of legislative choice under judicial review
predicts a choice of P at a lower value of x than for the simple legislative choice. Thus,
for all admissible values of p and λ, the threshold value of x, the cut point, at which a
legislator would vote “No” is reduced by the potential of judicial review. The possibility of
judicial annulment of legislation raises the the threshold of lost policy utility necessary to
overcome a positive gain from position taking necessary to induce legislative opposition.
To the extent that a legislator anticipates negative judicial review, she is relatively free to
vote for a policy change that enjoys the support of her constituents, even if she opposes
the policy personally. In other words, the model shows that judicial review transforms
legislators’ incentives in precisely the manner Thayer suggests, inducing some legislators
to vote for proposals that which they would have opposed in the absence of the possibility
of a judicial veto. More plainly, judicial review creates opportunities for legislators to
have their cake and eat it, too.
2.4 The Consequences of Judicial Review
The decision models proposed above lead to predictions of comparative voting behavior
across various levels of the likelihood that a court will annul a statute; that is, across
values of p. Thus, we can use the models to make predictions about how legislators’
voting behavior might change as a result of variance in the decision elements of the
models, which, in turn, might be used to assess the model empirically. The decision rule
at (2.14) implies that legislators’ decision-making on a particular proposal will be in part a
function of their expectations about judicial review and their valuation of position taking
relative to their the proposal’s policy utility. Thus, under different conditions on p and
α, individuals legislators voting choices on a given proposal may vary. I discuss each of
these in turn.
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2.4.1 Judicial Review
Assume that a proposal is associated with some positive position taking payoff and that
legislators place some uniform positive value on that payoff, i.e. y > 0 and αi > 0 ∀ i. On
the dimension x, along which legislators may be arrayed by their policy payoffs resulting
from the enaction of a given proposal, there exists a cut point, Θp, at:
−αy
p(1− λ) + λ (2.15)
such that legislators for whom xi < Θp (those to the left of the cut point) will vote “No”
on a proposal and those for whom xi ≥ Θp (those at or to the right of the cut point)
should vote “Yes.” This cut point will move along the dimension x as p varies, holding
all else constant. The cut point may exist anywhere in the range from −αy (where p = 1)
to −αy
λ
(where p = 0).
Between any two potential cut points, there exists an interesting interval in which
legislators’ voting behavior on a particular proposal is contingent on their belief of the
likelihood that a court will strike down the proposal. Thus, in a circumstance where
a legislature considered the same proposal twice, once where p1 ≤ 1 and again where
p2 < p1, the model predicts that legislators to the right of Θ1 line will vote “Yes” twice,
those to the left of Θ2 will vote “No” twice, and those legislators in the interval between
Θ1 and Θ2 will “flip” on the proposal, voting “No” at p1 and voting “Yes” at p2 (Figure
3).
The properties of this flip interval can be illustrated clearly by considering the special
cases where p = 1 and p = 0. In the case p = 1, a court will uphold a proposal with
certainty. This situation is equivalent to legislative voting in the absence of judicial review,
analogous to a congressional vote on a proposed constitutional amendment. The expected
utility for the pivotal legislator reduces to the utility associated with P under the simple
legislative choice, xp + αpy. The cut line, Θ1 falls at −αy. Substantively, on a given
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Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics over Judicial Review
vote under these circumstances, some marginal policy losers will vote to pass a proposal
(those for whom xi ≥ −αiy), but the bulk of the proposal’s policy opponents are willing
to absorb the lost position taking opportunity to prevent the policy change (those for
whom xi < −αiy).
Now, consider a second vote on the same proposal under the same general conditions,
but where a court is certain to annul the proposal, p = 0. This situation is comparable
a vote on a statute that faced a certainty of being annulled by the Supreme Court.
Substantively, a legislative vote in this case is an exercise in symbolic politics; a court
will annul the enacted proposal with certainty. More formally, the expected utility to the
pivotal legislator for choosing P reduces to λxp + αpy. Thus, the cut point, Θ2, falls at
−αy
λ
, which is to the left of Θ1. Thus, the model predicts that any legislator who falls
between Θ1 and Θ2 should flip on the proposal, voting “Yes” when p = 0 and having
voted “No” when p = 1.
2.4.2 Position Taking
In addition to expectations about judicial review, p, the weight attached to position
taking, α, also contributes to the location of a cut point, Θα, along the policy dimension
holding all else constant. Recall, the cut point is defined as:
−αy
p(1− λ) + λ (2.16)
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Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics on Position Taking
and α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, as a proposal’s position taking utility increases for legislators from
0 to 1, the value of the numerator in the cut point function grows, moving Θα to a lower
value on the dimension x (i.e. to the left). In terms of practical politics, this result is
intuitive. As a legislative proposal becomes more popular, it will become increasingly
difficult for election-seeking legislators to justify voting against a proposal because of
their private policy reservations. Thus, the value of x needed to induce a “No” vote is
negatively related to the position taking value of a proposal. So, legislators in a vulnerable
electoral position would be more likely to vote “Yes” on a popular proposal than their
like-minded colleagues who might be in safer seats.
Additionally, these position taking effects are interactive with expectations about ju-
dicial review in driving the location and size of the flip interval along x. As I have shown,
the flip interval for two legislative votes grows as the difference between p increases be-
tween the votes. And because λ and α are bound between 1 and 0, a given unit increase
in in α will move the cut line further at lower values of p than at higher values, expanding
the size of the interval and moving it to the left as α grows. This interactive effect is
depicted in Figure 4.
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2.5 An Empirical Assessment
Thayer argued that judicial review erodes legislative responsibility since legislators may
come to rely on courts to correct their errors—“If we are wrong. . . the courts will correct
it.” The preceding models have introduced a mechanical explanation for this theory;
judicial review introduces an element of risk associated with the policy consequences of
a legislative choice. The model, in turn, leads to clear predictions of the behavior of
legislators in various political circumstances, which may be used to assess the Thayerian
theory of the effects of judicial review.
An appropriate test of the theoretical model in the context of the United States
Congress would be an analysis of votes on a popular statute that is likely to be over-
turned by the Supreme Court and a popular constitutional amendment concerning the
same substantive issue considered by the same session of Congress. Under these condi-
tions, the theory advanced here predicts support for the statute from all but the strongest
policy opponents, since position taking benefits would outweigh the proposal’s sharply
reduced policy considerations given the likely negative reaction from the Court. However,
support for the amendment would be less widespread, since that would reflect a balance
of both policy concerns and position taking considerations. In other words, legislators
whose personal policy ideal points fall in the interval between ΘStatute and ΘAmendment
should vote differently on the same substantive policy question on the basis of changed
expectations about judicial review.
In 1989 and 1990, both houses of Congress cast a series of votes on proposed bans of
flag burning. The House and the Senate voted on a statutory ban, the Flag Protection
Act of 1989, as well as a constitutional amendment, which the Senate considered twice.
These votes were precipitated by a Supreme Court decision in the summer of 1989, Texas
v. Johnson (1989), to strike down state laws banning flag burning. This created a strong
expectation that the Court would strike down a statutory flag burning ban, creating a
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relatively high constant value for p across individuals. A statutory ban on flag burning
would be a “free vote.” An amendment, though, was almost certain to be ratified in the
states and carried strong policy consequences. This condition creates a quasiexperimental
control: most members of Congress cast at least two votes on the same substantive policy
question, in more or less the same political conditions, over short period of time: one in
the presence of judicial review (with a relatively low value of p) and one in its absence
(p = 1). Analyzing the preferences and political circumstances of the legislators involved
in these votes provides an opportunity to perform a simple, direct test of the theory of
legislative voting under judicial review advanced here.
2.5.1 Expectations
Under these conditions, the models lead to clear predictions about what factors might
lead to a member of Congress to cast a particular set of votes on the flag issue, that is,
to vote “No” on both the statute and the amendment, to vote cast two “Yes” votes, or
to flip on the issue, voting “Yes” on the statute while later opposing the amendment.
In particular, the models suggest two important independent variables in assessing their
empirical validity: legislators’ preferences (which corresponds to their location along the
policy dimension, x) and variance in legislators’ weight on the proposals’ position taking
value (α). These variables should be significantly related to the legislators’ individual cut
points on the two votes. Using observed patterns of voting across the flag burning votes as
a dependent variable, these hypotheses can be tested in relatively straightforward models
of flipping.
As for preferences, the theoretical model suggests a negative relationship between
support for civil liberties and legislative support for proposed the flag burning bans.
Those members of Congress with the highest levels of support for civil liberties (those
with the lowest value on x) should be the most likely to oppose the ban in both statutory
and amendment form. Those with the lowest level of support for civil liberties (those for
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whom x is relatively high) should be the most likely to support the ban on both votes.
Those with intermediate values of x, should be the most likely to flip on the flag issue,
supporting a flag desecration ban in statutory form and opposing it in amendment form.
Individual legislator’s relevant policy preferences can be measured using American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) scores.
In addition to policy preferences, position taking is the key concept in the decision
models—it is the interaction between this benefit and the likelihood of a judicial veto that
drives the location and size of the flip interval. As such, operationalizing the position
taking incentives facing legislators is critical for assessing the validity of the theoretical
model. The fact that position taking needs are strongly related to electoral concerns
provides leverage on this problem. Position taking incentives are likely to be especially
important for legislators for whom electoral concerns are more pronounced than others.
For the Senate, whose members are elected on a rotating basis, a dummy variable for
Senators seeking reelection in 1990 can be used as an indicator of variance on the weight
attached to gains from position taking, α, since these Senators were the first to face the
electorate after the flag votes, giving them less time and fewer opportunities to distance
themselves from unpopular votes. In the House, where members are elected on a uniform
schedule, the weight on position taking can be operationalized with the Representatives’
margin of victory in the previous election and a dummy variable for those in competitive
seats.11
I should note here that there were relatively few members of Congress, especially in
the Senate, who opposed the statutory ban on flag burning. The Senate vote on the Flag
Protection Act was 91-9; it was 380-38 in the House. Moreover, as I will discuss in more
detail, a number of these “No” votes came from conservatives who wished to express their
11The “winning margin” is the percent difference of the two party vote share of the Representative
over his or her opponent in the 1988 election. I count competitive seats as those won by less than a 10%
share of the two-party vote.
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preference for a constitutional solution over a statutory remedy. As such, there are only
a relatively small number of members of Congress for whom the cut point between voting
“No” twice and flipping is relevant. In the Senate, the numbers involved are sufficiently
small to motivate an ordinary logit model to assess the likelihood of moving from a “Yes”
vote on the statute to a “No” vote on the amendment. In the House, the larger number
of observations justifies a an ordered logit approach to model behavior across the three
categories.
In both cases, the theoretical models lead to clear predictions about the sign and
significance of the coefficient estimates in these models of flipping. Indicators of policy
preferences, where higher commitment to civil liberties are coded with higher values,
should be positively and significantly related to stronger categorical opposition to the
flag desecration ban, i.e. moving from casting two “Yes” votes to flipping, moving from
flipping to casting two “No” votes. Substantively, those who have the most to lose in
a policy space should be the most likely to vote against a proposal when it will count.
Conversely, indicators of electoral sensitivity should be negatively and significantly related
to opposing the flag burning ban. Those most in need of the proposal’s position taking
value should be most apt to vote on the popular side of the issue whenever possible.
2.5.2 The Flag Burning Controversy: Background
In August, 1984, Gregory Johnson was arrested for violating Texas’s flag desecration
statute by burning an American flag outside the Republican National Convention in Dal-
las.12 He was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison and a $2,000 fine. Johnson
appealed his conviction, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned his convic-
tion on First Amendment grounds. The state of Texas appealed to United States Supreme
12Readers interested in a more complete narrative of the flag burning controversy that played out in
1989 and 1990 should consult Goldstein (1996), and for an empirical analysis of House votes on the 1990
flag protection amendment, see Clark and McGuire (1996).
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Court, arguing that its statute protected a unique national symbol. In March, 1989, the
Supreme Court heard arguments in Texas v. Johnson (1989); in June, the Court rendered
its decision.
By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court held that flag burning is expressive speech
protected by the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
concluded, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” The Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson catalyzed
the “flag burning” issue.
The public’s response to Texas v. Johnson was decisive. A poll conducted the day
after the Court handed down its decision found that 71% of adults would “support a new
constitutional amendment to make flag burning illegal.” Only 24% opposed the amend-
ment.13 Goldstein (1996) writes,
The. . . Johnson decision touched off what Newsday characterized as a “firestorm
of indignation” and Newsweek termed “stunned outrage” across the United
States. Certainly, no Supreme Court decision within recent memory, if ever,
was so quickly, bitterly, and overwhelmingly denounced by the American pub-
lic and political establishment (p. 113).
The support for a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling prompted swift action from the
Congress.
Republican leaders, supported a constitutional amendment to empower Congress to
prohibit flag burning. Many Democratic leaders campaigned to create a statutory flag
burning ban. Republicans countered that the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. John-
son made it clear that it would not tolerate a statutory ban. Democrats counselled a “wait
13Gallup Poll conducted June 23, 1989. N=500 Adults.
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and see” approach, advocating a statutory solution until the Supreme Court could recon-
sider the issue. However, the Court’s forceful decision made the prospect of a legislative
solution dim.14
That October, congressional responses to the flag issue took two forms: passage of a
statute banning flag burning, the Flag Protection Act of 1989, and consideration of a con-
stitutional amendment to empower Congress to prohibit the desecration of the American
flag. The Senate voted on both the flag protection statute, which passed, and the consti-
tutional amendment, which failed. The House considered only the statute, which passed;
Democratic leaders were successful in preventing a vote on the constitutional amendment
at that time.
The Flag Protection Act took effect on October 30, 1989. At midnight, protesters
across the country burned American flags. Three protesters, Shawn Eichman, Dave
Blalock, and Dread Scott, were arrested on the steps of the United States Capitol.
In March 1990, the protesters pled guilty in federal district court but argued that the
Flag Protection Act was unconstitutional. The district court agreed and set aside the
protesters’ convictions.
Under a provision of the Flag Protection Act, the Supreme Court heard an expedited
appeal of the district court’s decision. While some observes may have had doubted the
case’s outcome, there appears to have been a consensus that the Supreme Court which
had acted to protect flag burning in Johnson would not have changed its mind in a matter
of months. These suspicions were confirmed on June 11, 1990 when the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in United States v. Eichman (1990). By the same 5 to 4 vote
as Texas v. Johnson, the Court held that the Flag Protection Act unconstitutionally
prohibited expressive speech. Concluding for the majority, Justice Brennan wrote, “the
14Senator Robert Dole wrote, “it [proposed statutory remedy] flunks the test...because the statute itself
is unconstitutional...[T]he Supreme Court has already ruled that the government can’t protect the flag
as a ‘symbol’” (Dole 1989).
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[Flag Protection] Act suffers from the same fundamental flaw as the Texas law [at issue
in Johnson].”
Following the Court’s decision, Congress again took up the issue. In June, both houses
of Congress voted on a flag protection amendment. Though the proposal received majority
support in both houses, it failed to achieve the two-thirds support necessary to send the
amendment to the states for ratification.
2.5.3 Comparative Vote Analysis: The Senate
In October, Senators cast their first vote on flag burning, a vote for passage of the Flag
Protection Act of 1989 which had previously passed the House of Representatives. Given
public support for a flag burning ban and the high probability that the Supreme Court
would not tolerate a federal flag burning ban when it had just struck down similar state
laws, the theoretical models predict broad support for the statute. Only those Senators
most committed to a to civil liberties (those who had the largest policy losses under the
statute) should have voted against the bill.
The Senate vote was 91 for the statute with 9 against. Three conservative Senators,
Robert Dole (R-KS), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) voted against the
statute to demonstrate their preference for a constitutional amendment. Senator Gordon
Humphrey (R-NH), who was about to retire from the Senate, called the flag issue “an
exercise in silliness” and voted against the bill (Lewis 1989).15 The remaining no votes
came from civil libertarians: John Chafee (R-RI), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Bob Kerrey
(D-NE), Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).
Sincere “No” votes on the flag burning statute came from among those who have
15Speaking on the floor of the Senate, Senator Humphrey argued that the rush to create a flag burning
prohibition demeaned the national legislature’s upper house. He remarked, “In this present circumstance,
namely the pendency of this resolution, one might ask: What distinguishes the Senate from the House
of Representatives, except that we serve for 6 years?...Where is the cool and the calm and . . . to expect
of the Senate? Perhaps it will yet prevail. . . But, certainly, for a while, it was a very near thing and not
the least bit becoming to the Senate, in my view” (Congressional Record 1989).
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embraced the highest levels of support for a broad definition of civil liberties.16 Aside
from the pro-amendment “No” votes, along with Senator Humphrey’s esoteric “Nay”, all
opposition to the statute came from the most libertarian cohorts, in keeping with the
theory of legislative voting discussed above. In Table 1, I report the votes of Senators on
the Flag Protection Act of 1989 tabulated by ACLU score quintiles.
Table 2.1: Senate Flag Burning Votes
Statute 89 Amend’t 90 Amend’t
ACLU Score Quintle Yes No Yes No Yes No
1 (0-14) 23 4 26 1 26 1
2 (15-31) 13 0 11 1 13 0
3 (32-67) 20 0 11 9 14 6
4 (68-80) 18 2 3 17 5 15
5 (81-100) 17 3 0 20 0 20
Total 91 9 51 48 58 42
The second Senate vote on the flag issue came roughly two weeks later, when it
considered a constitutional amendment to empower Congress to ban flag burning. Recall,
the theoretical models predicts that voting on a constitutional amendment would reflect
a balance between position taking needs and sincere policy concerns. Given a relatively
uniformly large and positive position taking gain to be had by supporting a flag burning
ban, the models predict that Senators would have been increasingly likely to oppose
the ban as their commitment to civil liberties grew. Again, the data indicate that this
prediction holds.
16The “No” votes in the first quintile are from Senators Dole, Grassley, Hatch, and Humphrey.
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The Senate voted 51 to 48 for the amendment, which failed to achieve the two-thirds
support required for passage. Forty-two Senators switched sides, voting against the con-
stitutional ban on flag burning despite casting a vote in favor of the Flag Protection
Act. Senator Pete Wilson (R-CA) did not vote on the amendment. In Table 1, I report
the votes of Senators on the 1989 Flag Burning Amendment tabulated by ACLU rat-
ing quintiles. The pattern of voting on the flag burning amendment support the notion
that Senators, relieved of the threat of judicial review, were substantially more sanguine
about limiting the scope of free speech. Indeed, opposition to the amendment is positively
correlated with higher ACLU scores (0.79).
This interpretation is reinforced by the results of an estimated logit model of “flipping”
among those 90 Senators who cast a “Yes” vote on the statute. I report the results in
Table 2. The estimates also confirm the intuition of the theoretical models. Higher ACLU
scores, indicating increased support for civil liberties, predict an increased propensity to
flip. As Senators’ policy loss grows under the proposal, as their position along the policy
dimension x moves left, they are more likely to be on the left side of the relevant cut
point.
Conversely, a forthcoming reelection bid, placing a premium on being on the right
side of an issue, predicts a propensity for remaining supportive of the flag burning ban.
Recall, an elevated value of α will shift the flip cut point to the left. Ceteris paribus a
legislator with a relatively high value on position taking is more likely to be to the left of
the relevant cut point along x than a legislator with a lower value on α. Both this result
and the model’s estimates for Senators preferences confirm the model’s predictions.17
17An estimated logit model of flipping predicted by ACLU scores, a 1990 reelection dummy, first
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), and a dummy for Democratic partisan-
ship produces substantively identical results with respect to the theoretically derived variables. ACLU
scores produce a significant positive effect; 1990 reelection produces a significant negative effect. See the
Appendix for the results of the extended control model.
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Table 2.2: Logit Analysis of Senate Flipping
(1 = “Flip”)
Predictors 89 Amend’t 90 Amend’t
ACLU Rating 0.11*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.03)
1990 Reelection -1.53** -2.07**
(0.83) (0.91)
Constant -5.03*** -6.74***
(1.17) (1.60)
χ2 79.60 82.98
Pseudo R2 0.64 0.68
PRE 0.79 0.78
N 90 91
Note: Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
One tailed tests.
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Figure 2.5: Predicted Probabilities of Senate Flipping
Figure 7 shows the marginal effects of changes in support for civil liberties on a Sena-
tor’s propensity to flip under two different electoral situations. This figure also supports
the intuition of the theoretical models. Senators who place a higher value on civil liberties
are more likely to change from voting for a statutory ban on flag burning to voting against
a constitutional ban on flag burning. The only substantive difference in these situations
is the potential for judicial review in the statutory case. The presence of judicial review
over the statute acts as a quasiexperimental control; the observed changes in voting be-
havior are the result of the influence of judicial review on members’ of Congress decision
calculus.
A Senator might have plausibly, if naively, believed that the Flag Protection Act was
sufficiently distinguishable from the state laws overturned in Texas v. Johnson as to
escape a judicial veto. But, following the Supreme Court’s actions in U.S. v. Eichman,
a straightforward statutory remedy was not available in the absence of constitutional
change. Preventing flag burning unambiguously demanded a constitutional amendment.
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This additional vote on the amendment provides another chance to assess the models’
comparative predictions on Senators’ votes with the policy stakes of the vote more clear
than in the preceding October. The Senate vote was 58 to 42, failing to meet the con-
stitutional requirement of two-thirds majority support to send a proposed amendment to
the states. Ninety-one Senators cast votes on both 1989 vote on the Flag Protection Act
and the 1990 proposed constitutional amendment; 36 Senators flipped on these votes. In
Table 2, I report the results of a logit analysis of this second set of flips.
The results confirm the findings of the prior model of flipping. Higher support for civil
liberties produced a heightened propensity to switch sides on an issue once the possibility
of judicial review was removed. Likewise, a higher valuation of position taking on the
issue predicts a reduced probability of switching sides. The intervening actions of the
Supreme Court only marginally affect the estimates in the two cases, producing slightly
larger predicted effects for the independent variables and a somewhat better overall fit.18
2.5.4 Comparative Vote Analysis: The House
The House of Representatives also held two roll call votes on the flag issue: a vote on the
Flag Protection Act of 1989 in October and a vote on a flag burning amendment in June
1990. The statute passed by a vote of 380 to 38. The amendment garnered 253 votes;
there were 175 votes against, failing to achieve a two-thirds majority. Among the members
of the House who voted on both items, 229 voted “Yes” twice, 149 “flipped,” voting yes
on the statute and no on the amendment, and 20 Representatives were consistent “No”
voters. 19 These votes are tabulated by ACLU rating quintiles in Table 3.
18The estimates produced by an extended control model as described in footnote 12 remain substan-
tively the same.
19Eighteen Representatives, all Republicans, also voted “No” on the statute and “Yes” on the amend-
ment. Though an explanation of their behavior is immediately evident from the political context, these
votes are beyond the predictive facility of the models advanced above and are excluded from the empirical
analyses reported here.
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Table 2.3: House Flag Burning Votes
Statute Amendment
ACLU Score Quintle Yes No Yes No
1 (0-12) 97 11 107 1
2 (13-31) 57 7 59 9
3 (32-57) 85 1 65 22
4 (58-85) 88 3 21 72
5 (86-100) 53 16 1 71
Total 380 38 253 175
The eyeball-level patterns of flipping comport with those observed in the Senate. House
members became more likely to oppose the flag burning bans as their commitment to civil
liberties grew. This interpretation is supported by the results of an ordered logit analysis
of the three categories of House voters: consistent opponents (coded high), flippers (coded
middle), and consistent supporters (coded low). I report these estimates in Table 4.20, 21
Among members of the House who voted on both items, commitment to civil liberties, thus
a larger policy loss under an enacted flag burning ban, is significantly, positively related
to opposing the flag burning bans. At the same time, Representatives of competitive
districts, those with an higher value of taking a popular stand on a salient issue, were
significantly more likely to more consistently support the flag burning ban.
Figures 6 and 7 show the marginal effects of changes in support for civil liberties
20Again, the estimates produced by an extended control model as described in footnote 12 remain
substantively the same for the theoretically important variables (Appendix).
21Including the 18 members of Congress excluded for voting “No” on the statute and “Yes” on the
amendment as a fourth, ordered category of “reverse flippers,” however, produces substantively the same
results as the included analyses. ACLU scores have a significant positive effect; an indicator for members
serving competitive districts yields a significant negative effect.
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Table 2.4: Ordered Logit Analysis of House Voting Cohorts
(Consistent Opponents=2, “Flippers”=1, Consistent Supporters=0)
Predictors Effects
ACLU Rating 0.09***
(0.01)
1988 Win Margin 0.00
(0.01)
Competitive District -1.37**
(0.70)
Cut Line 1 4.86***
(0.54)
Cut Line 2 9.47***
(0.76)
χ2 316.06
Pseudo R2 0.48
PRE 0.55
N 396
Note: Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
One tailed tests.
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Probabilities of Flag Vote Categories (House-Safe Seats)
on a Representative’s voting records under different electoral situations. In both safe
and competitive districts, the probability being a consistent opponent of flag burning is
maximized as general support for civil liberties is minimized. The probability of being a
flipper is maximized among middling support of civil liberties, and the probability of being
a consistent opponent of the flag burning ban is maximized at the highest level of support
for civil liberties. Also, moving from a safe district to a competitive district shifts the cut
points in the predicted direction. In other words, the estimates indicate that the increased
commitment to civil liberties necessary to induce an increasingly anti-ban voting record is
elevated in the case of a competitive district over the case of a safe district. These results
also support the predictions of the theoretical models; indeed, they follow directly from
the comparative predictions of the decision theoretical models presented earlier (Figure
3).
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Figure 2.7: Predicted Probabilities of Flag Vote Categories (House-Competitive Seats)
2.6 Concerns
The process for ratifying a constitutional amendment complicates the interpretation of
these results. While the intense public support for the flag burning amendment in 1989 and
1990 was likely an indicator of the amendment’s ability to achieve approval in the states,
a flag burning ban would not necessarily have been implemented despite a congressional
vote “in the absence of judicial review.” However, this should strengthen the interpretation
of the results offered above. Since the expected utility from policy change under the
amendment must have been attenuated by the small possibility that it would not have
been ratified, legislators would have been less likely generally to have flipped on the flag
issue at all. Thus, any observed variance in voting behavior has occurred despite the
discount on policy change members of Congress may have applied to policy change in the
amendment case.
Also, the observed patterns of vote changing analyzed here might be the result of
some exogenous preference against amending the Constitution regardless of the policy
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associated with that act. This would produce some flips on any issue considered by
Congress in both amendment and statutory form. While this may be the case, it is likely
that a sincere personal preference for constitutional protectionism that is systematically
related to policy preferences. In particular, preferences for constitutional protectionism,
assuming that are not merely attitudinal pretenses for fighting a particular policy change,
are not likely to be meaningfully correlated with the predictors in the empirical models
presented here. In other words, while opponents of constitutional change are apt to invoke
the sanctity of the Constitution to rally support their cause (even if they would willingly
change the Constitution to protect their preferred policy outcome), it is unlikely that
sincere constitutional protectionism would be collinear with both preferences over civil
liberties and an elevated value for position taking.
In particular, the observed relationship between flipping and electoral sensitivity is
a compelling result in this respect. Recall, Senators seeking reelection in 1990 are less
likely to flip than others, as are members of the House in competitive districts. The
constitutional protectionism counterargument has no facility to explain this result, which
is directly predicted by the model advanced here. So, if constitutional protectionism has
some effect on congressional voting behavior, it is most likely that this effect coexists
with, rather than detracts from, the effects of judicial review on members’ of Congress
voting calculus.
Lastly, it is important to consider to what extent the model presented here is gener-
alizeable, particularly in light of the unusual political circumstances that surrounded the
case study used to assess the model. While the expectations about judicial review were
unusually strong in the flag burning case, producing especially clear indications of the
competing considerations facing members of Congress, the dynamic of legislative voting
under judicial review is likely to emerge on any proposal that is constitutionally ques-
tionable. For example, many proposals involving campaign finance, abortion, religion,
domestic terrorism investigations, and affirmative action fall into this category. The flag
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controversy of 1989 and 1990 is not a unique case of constitutionally questionable leg-
islating, it is merely unique in the juxtaposition of viable statutory and constitutional
proposals that emerged in Congress, providing leverage to assess the effects of this dy-
namic empirically. In principle, this model could be assessed in any circumstance where
a two such votes have taken place.
2.7 Conclusions
The models and analyses reported here indicate that Thayer’s critique of judicial review
offers an apt account of legislative decision-making in cases where legislators may antic-
ipate a judicial veto. This dynamic emerges because the institution of judicial review
creates the possibility for legislators to cast “free votes,” that is, to vote with reduced
expected policy consequences. Specifically, the models predict that as the probability
that a court will annul popular legislation increases, a proposal is likely to garner growing
support in a legislature. Thus, judicial review is capable of altering the expected payoffs
to legislators for supporting a proposal even in cases where a great deal of uncertainty
over the likely outcome of litigation is present. This dynamic might affecting individual
legislative voting behavior and, perhaps, the outcomes of relevant votes.
This theoretical result is supported by empirical analyses of congressional votes sur-
rounding the issue of flag burning in 1989 and 1990. The results hold across all relevant
pairs of votes and in both chambers of Congress. Together, these results indicate that
judicial review creates opportunities for Congress to enact legislation that does not reflect
its members’ best policy judgements. Indeed, this study of legislative voting under judicial
review demonstrates important but under-appreciated dimensions of judicial influence in
the American political system.
Thayer’s (1893) admonition that judicial review “drive[s] out questions of justice and
right” in legislatures appears as valid in the modern period as in his own. Faced with
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the opportunity to shirk and delegate an unpopular task to the judiciary, members of
Congress face tremendous political incentives to forgo voting on the basis of their private,
policy judgments and follow the popular currents. Again, this dynamic is likely to emerge
as part and parcel of the consideration of proposals in a number of policy domains that
regularly induce judicial review: campaign finance, abortion, religion, domestic terrorism
investigation, and affirmative action, for example. While these issues make up only a
fraction of the business of Congress, they are among the most salient and important
issues in contemporary politics. This study provides insight into an important dynamic
of legislative decision-making on these issues, generated by judicial review, which has not
received much attention from political scientists.
While this analysis is aimed at understanding a particular dynamic of legislative-
judicial relations, it also speaks to a more general issue in the study of legislative behavior.
Legislators, and perhaps members of Congress especially, pursue a variety of goals in their
office. These goals may often pressure legislators in a competing fashion. Strategic politi-
cians can and will take advantage of institutional structures, such as judicial review and,
perhaps, the presidential veto, to pursue multiple goals simultaneously. Uncovering the
mechanisms available to legislators to balance their complex policy and political motives
is an important but underdeveloped topic.
Chapter 3
The Supreme Court and Media
Attention to Homosexuality
Scholars have invested tremendous resources in examining the links between the Supreme
Court and the larger political system. While some prominently conclude that the Supreme
Court has little broad influence on public policy or public opinion (Rosenberg 1991), a
growing literature has identified numerous paths of influence from the Court into the exter-
nal political environment. For example, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) find that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade polarized public opinion on abortion. Valerie Hoekstra
(2000, 2003) finds that Supreme Court decision may influence the aggregate distribution
of political attitudes in communities with strong attachments (and thus large information
flows) to particular cases, such as the communities from which cases originated. And, of
particular importance here, Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997; Flemming, Wood, and
Bohte 1999) show that some Supreme Court decisions have drawn the media’s attention
to political issues involved in those cases.
In particular, Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) offer a critical exploration of the
relationship between Supreme Court decision-making and the media. They show that a
subset of the Court’s decisions on school desegregation, free speech, and religion increased
the media’s attention to those issues. Specifically, Flemming, Bohte, and Wood find
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the cases that “markedly rearranged the prior distribution of political benefits, either
material or symbolic, for various segments of the population” (1997, p. 1247) produced the
observed agenda-setting effects. In other words, Flemming and his coauthors generalize
that cases which substantially change a status quo policy are likely to draw the media’s
attention to the issue involved in the case. That inductive claim can serve as a general
theory of media responsiveness to the Supreme Court that can be tested out-of-sample-
sample.
Here, I employ that theory of agenda-setting to develop hypotheses about the media’s
responsiveness to the Supreme Court’s gay right’s cases from 1990 to 2005. Specifically, I
argue that those cases which expanded the scope of gay rights, i.e. those that “rearranged
the prior distribution of political benefits,” should accompany increases in the media’s
attention to homosexuality. Conversely, those cases that confirm an existing policy should
have no effect on media coverage.
I test these hypotheses using monthly indicators of the level of attention paid to
homosexuality by two stylistically divergent newspapers, The New York Times and USA
Today, employing Box-Tiao (1975) intervention analyses to assess the influence of relevant
court actions on these media time series. The results indicate that changes in the media’s
coverage of homosexuality largely conform to theoretical predictions. Significant increases
in attention to homosexuality accompanied Supreme Court decisions that expanded gay
rights, though the effects varied somewhat across media outlets, while the remaining
cases had no effect on media coverage. The data confirm that the Supreme Court can
be systematically influential in raising the media profile of an issue in American politics
though media outlets may respond somewhat differently to these stimuli.
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3.1 The Supreme Court, the Media, and Agendas
The idea that agendas and agenda control matter for determining political outcomes may
be among the most widely held ideas in modern political science. Moving an issue or an
alternative onto the agenda, that is to say, to the attention of those who are empowered
to make policy changes, is a necessary condition for policy change to occur (Bachrach
and Baratz 1964). For American national politics, numerous studies suggest, the national
media’s agenda—the issues chosen to fill pages of print and minutes of broadcast time—
have a strong effect on which proposed policy changes receive serious consideration in the
elected branches of government, and which are dead on arrival (e.g. Cook et al 1983;
Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998; Kingdon 1989; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Thus,
political scientists have frequently asked, who sets the media’s agenda?
In part, the answer may be the Supreme Court. Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997)
investigate the role of the Court in elevating the media’s attention to some issues—
specifically civil rights, free speech, and public displays of religion (1997) and civil rights,
civil liberties, and environmental policy (See also Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999).
Generally, the authors find that, of the Court’s substantively important decisions in these
issue areas (those listed in the CQ Guide to the United States Supreme Court), a small
number have a significant influence on the media’s systematic attention to the issues each
case involved. The cases identified by Flemming, Bohte, and Wood are shown in Table
3.1, along with information about the case’s date, subject matter, and the duration of the
media effect attached to each case.
Explaining these results, i.e. why these cases produced changes in the media’s atten-
tion to issues while other legally important cases did not, the authors argue that this
subset of cases created important changes in the distribution of constitutional rights:
Each decision markedly rearranged the prior distribution of political ben-
efits, either material or symbolic, for various segments of the population. The
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Table 3.1: Agenda-Setting Cases: 1947-1992
Case Decision Date Issue Effect Type
Brown v. Board of Education May 1954 Civil Rights Permanent
Cooper v. Aaron September 1958 Civil Rights Permanent
Griffin v. County School Board of May 1964 Civil Rights Transient
Prince Edward County
Texas v. Johnson June 1989 Free Speech Permanent
Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. March 1948 Establishment Permanent
Board of Education
Engel v. Vitale June 1962 Establishment Permanent
Lynch v. Donnelly March 1984 Establishment Transient
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issues involved in in all of these decisions were also highly affective. As a result,
the decisions were extremely controversial at the time they were announced.
The media participated in expanding the scope of system-wide conflict con-
flict by publicizing the initial decision and its implications. In each case, the
Supreme Court’s decisions sparked intense national debates that drew in new
participants and expanded the scope of conflict through time. . . The issues
involved in each decision opened wide ideological cleavages among political
actors that remain until this day.
Other cases, while substantively important, may have confirmed an existing status quo
or offered a marginal refinement to a previous “landmark” case that established or redis-
tributed political benefits, thus failing to generate enough “news” to draw the media’s
attention.
This explanation of observed results amounts to a general theory of the media’s respon-
siveness to the Supreme Court. Like all such claims generated from exploring patterns
in one set of observations, though, Flemming, Bohte, and Wood’s (1997) theory of media
responsiveness to the Supreme Court requires out-of-sample validation. As Beck, King,
and Zeng (2000) note, “[A]ll statistical analysts must be concerned about whether they
are taking advantage of some idiosyncratic features of their data [when drawing infer-
ences]. . . To guard against this problem. . . out-of-sample forecast accuracy is considered
the gold standard for model assessment.” In this case, an out-of-sample test requires iden-
tifying a previously unexamined issue space in which the Court has acted to both confirm
existing group rights and “rearrange” political benefits and then examining media cover-
age of that issue to see if its behavior over time conforms to the theory’s predictions.
I take up this task through study of the Supreme Court’s influence on the media’s
attention to homosexuality. In particular, I examine the extent to which the Court’s
gay rights decisions drew systematic attention to homosexuality from 1990 through 2005.
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“Gay rights” is a quintessential “affective issue” and fits directly into the theoretical par-
adigm advanced by Flemming and his colleagues. In the last decade and a half, homosex-
uality’s role as an issue has grown in importance, emerging alongside abortion as a central
“social” or “cultural” issue in national and state-level politics. Moreover, homosexuality
is a policy domain in which courts are presumed to have been instrumental in determining
policy outcomes, though no academic studies have investigated this conjecture.
Also, to capture the potentially divergent streams of coverage that exist in different
media outlets, I have chosen two distinct print news sources, The New York Times and
USA Today, to represent the range of news coverage of the relevant political issue, homo-
sexuality. These newspapers both enjoy a wide, national readership though they embrace
diverse styles and intended audiences. The New York Times is often regarded as the na-
tion’s newspaper of record, at least by political and social elites. Its content is heavily and
consciously dominated by “hard news” and its writing is geared toward a relatively well-
educated audience. USA Today, on the other hand, is famously written and illustrated
to appeal to a mass public audience—human interest stories frequently share space with
prominent news items. In many respects, these two newspapers represent poles in style
and substance available in the American print media. These least similar cases should
reveal any heterogeneity in various media outlets attention to a given political issue and
thus, taken together, provide indicators for a robust test of Flemming, Bohte, and Wood’s
theory.
3.2 Identifying Relevant Cases
Not all Supreme Court decisions are likely to draw the media’s attention to a given issue.
Many cases involve obscure issues, legal technicalities, or controversies without broad pol-
icy consequences. On the other hand, a subset of cases may have important consequences
for the media’s attention to an issue. “[D]ecisions that overturn long-standing precedents,
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create new precedents or establish new rights, push the Court into new areas of consti-
tutional law, or alter political relationships between individuals, groups, or institutions
are the kind of decisions that presumably reshape national dialogues” (Flemming, Bohte,
and Wood 1997, pp. 1230-31).
Defining the political rights and the social standing of gays, lesbians, and other sexual
minorities is a relatively new issue in American national politics. Almost by definition,
then, any Supreme Court decision that touches on the scope of gay rights creates a new
precedent—either including or excluding homosexuals from some constitutional or legal
protection. The relevant task for this study, then, is to identify the set of Supreme Court
cases which involve some aspect of gay rights.
The subset of relevant cases can be identified through the application of a relatively
simple criteria to the most widely used database of Supreme Court decisions. I analyze
any Supreme Court decision that involves as a litigant a homosexual person or group or
agency which advocates for gay rights which was decided between 1990 and 2005, the dates
for which media coverage data are available. Specifically, I admit those cases recorded
in Spaeth’s United States Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005) which identify one or
another parties to the case as a “homosexual person or organization.”1 In this instance,
the Spaeth database is especially useful, since it identifies parties based on references in
the Court’s writings on the case. Parties are described using “terminology which places
them in the context of the litigation in which they are involved” (Spaeth 2005, p. 23).
Thus, database entries that identify one or another party as a “homosexual person or
organization” do so because this identification is relevant to the issue before the Court.
In other words, cases involving a party identified as a ”homosexual person or organization”
are cases involving an issue that makes the sexual identity of the party relevant: a gay
1Specifically, I use those orally argued cases for which the variables “PARTY 1” or “PARTY 2” are
coded as “GAY.”
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right’s case.2
This search reveals four relevant cases in the observed period: Hurley et al v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group (1995), Romer v. Evans (1996), Boy Scouts
of America (BSA) v. Dale (2000), and Lawrence v. Texas (2003). The cases are sum-
marized in Table 3.2. In two of these cases, Hurley and BSA, the Court held that the
First Amendment protected private organizations from state laws that barred the exclu-
sion of homosexual from “public accommodations,” retracting state protections against
discrimination. On the other hand, the remaining cases acted to protect or expand gay
rights. Romer invalidated a voter-created amendment to Colorado’s constitution which
forbade identification of homosexuals as a protected class under antidiscrimination laws.
Lawrence invalidated state sodomy prohibitions, overturning Bowers v. Hardwick (1986).
Flemming, Bohte, and Woods theory of media response to the Supreme Court leads to
clear predictions about how coverage of homosexuality should respond to three of the four
decisions. Clearly, the theorey predicts that Lawrence, which overturned a relatively recent
precedent and greatly expanded the substantive and symbolic rights of homosexuals,
should draw the media’s attention to the issue of homosexuality. And, those cases that
ratified the right of private organizations to exclude homosexual, Hurley and BSA, should
have no effect on media coverage.
The fourth case, Romer v. Evans, is more complicated, though. Superficially, the
Supreme Court created a policy change, invalidating Colorado’s 1992 Amendment 2. That
situation should produce a change in the media’s attention to homosexuality. However,
that voter-created clause had never gone into effect; its implementation had been enjoined
by a federal district court almost immediately after its ratification by Colorado’s voters.
Also, the amendment had been declared unconstitutional by Colorado’s Supreme Court in
2This procedure is superior to using Spaeth’s “ISSUE” variable. This variable might be used to identify
subsets of cases which might include those relevant for this study, such as privacy and due process, but
these identifiers would include many other cases that are not relevant, i.e. the “ISSUE” variable does not
identify an exclusive class of gay rights cases.
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Table 3.2: Gay Rights in the Supreme Court: 1990-2005
Case Decision Date Holding
Hurley et al v. Irish-American June 1995 “The. . . application of the Massachusetts
Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group public accommodations law to require private
citizens who organize a parade to include
among the marchers a group imparting a
message that the organizers do not wish to
wish to convey violates the First Amendment.”
Romer v. Evans May 1996 “[Colorado’s] Amendment 2 [prohibiting laws
which provide antidiscrimination protection to
homosexuals] violates the Equal Protection
Clause.”
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale June 2000 “Applying New Jersey’s public accommodations
law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale [a
homosexual] violates the Boy Scouts’ First
Amendment right of expressive association.”
Lawrence v. Texas June 2003 “The Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct violates the Due
Process Clause.”
65
1993 and 1994 on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Thus, the state of Colorado’s appeal
in Romer amounted to a final attempt to force the implementation of a policy change that
had never taken effect. Given the murky nature of defining the status quo with respect to
the case, there is no clear theoretical prediction about its relationship with media change.
3.3 Measuring Homosexuality in the Media’s Agenda
The central measurement task in this study is to establish the level of media attention to
homosexuality. Fortunately, previous studies of the role of national political institutions’
influence on the media provide ample guidance in this task. In particular, Flemming,
Bohte, and Wood’s (1997) study of the judiciary’s role in agenda setting is particularly
germane, and it is in this study’s mold, with an important modification, that I proceed.
Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) show that a small set of important Supreme Court
decisions have drawn the media’s attention to issues, such as desegregation and prayer in
public schools, that were not previously on the national political agenda, at least at the
pitch at which they appeared after the Court acted.3 They reach this conclusion through
an analysis of a monthly count of news stories listed in The Readers’ Guide to Periodical
Literature containing at least one of a set of keywords that indicate articles that relate to
the issues under analysis. In their own words, these authors choose The Readers’ Guide
as a data source because:
[I]t surveys a wide assortment of general interest and specialized publi-
cations with a combined readership far greater than the circulation of any
single newspaper...[and] because of the size and diversity of markets served by
3This finding contrasts with the well-known conclusion reached by Rosenberg (1991), who argued that
Supreme Court decision-making does not significantly alter the media’s coverage of particular issues.
Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) conclude that Rosenberg’s result is a product of his reliance on an
overly broad measure of media coverage of race-related stories, which failed to capture sharp increases in
media coverage of segregated public education and racial segregation generally (p. 1229, n6).
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the periodicals, the combined editorial emphases. . . can be assumed to be more
representative of concerns on the systematic agenda than measures resting on
selective, narrow samples of...media [Emphasis added] (p. 128).
For this reason, The Readers’ Guide has been a recurring source of article count data for
political scientists studying the effects of institutional activity on the media’s agenda (e.g.
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1997; Rosenberg 1991).
This methodological choice, has important theoretical implications, though. The au-
thors explicitly choose to examine agenda setting affects common to the broad spectrum
of American media. This choice consciously, and for good reason in the context of a partic-
ular research question, ignores potentially important variance in issue attention that may
occur within particular publications or sets of publications over time. Many differences
exist among media with respect to geographic dispersion, audience sophistication, and
competitive standing. These differences place unique economic pressures on each media
outlet. Moreover, these influences may interact with the journalistic and ideological pre-
dispositions of editors and publishers to yield interesting variance across different media
with respect to the type and volume of coverage offered to different issues at different
times. For studies of agenda-setting, it may be advantageous to examine issue coverage
across individual media outlets rather than to treat the media as a single unit.
I measure the media’s attention to homosexuality, through a simple count of the
mean number of daily stories in each month in The New York Times and USA Today,
archived at Lexis-Nexis, that mention a set of keywords which indicate content related
to homosexuality.4 The two series stretch from January 1990 to December 2005 (Figure
3.1).
A cursory inspection of these time series indicates at least two differences between
4The keywords are: gay, gays, lesbian, lesbians, homosexual, and homosexuals. Interestingly, the most
regular contamination of this procedure is annual surge in the number articles mentioning the keyword
“gay” surrounding the anniversary of the American bombing of Hiroshima at the close of World War II.
As such, articles that include the term “Enola” are excluded.
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Figure 3.1: Media Coverage of Homosexuality: Monthly Mean Daily Stories
them. First, the absolute difference in magnitude between the two series is seemingly
large. While The New York Times reports an average of approximately 4.7 stories per
day that make some mention of homosexuality, USA Today reports an average of only
1.5; this difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01). In fact, USA Today ’s attention
to homosexuality exceeds the observed minimum of The New York Times ’ coverage, 2.1
stories per day, in only 20 of 187 months observed. More plainly, on any given day, The
New York Times is likely to have published about 3 more stories involving homosexuality
than USA Today.
Aside from the difference in the level of attention to homosexuality evident between
these two series, there is also a marked difference in trends. The New York Times series
has a relatively strong upward trend of approximately 0.013 daily stories per month.5
5The time series’ trends are diagnosed by the estimation of the OLS model, yt = α0+α1t+²t, where α1
indicates the estimated trend component. The detrended time series used here are obtained by removing
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This amounts to an expected difference of nearly two stories per day from t1 to t192. In
contrast, the USA Today time series exhibits a small, but significant, downward trend
of roughly 0.003 stories per month. This reflects a reduction of roughly one half story
per day over the observed time period. Substantively, these divergent trends reflect a
growing heterogeneity in the media’s treatment of homosexuality. In The New York
Times, homosexuality has become an increasingly prominent issue over the 1990s and
into the new century. Conversely, USA Today has moved (very) modestly away from
coverage of homosexuality in terms of absolute attention to the issue.
These superficial differences, however, mask underlying similarities. First, absolute
differences in coverage of homosexuality in the two papers fail to show that the coverage
of this issue relative to other important policy topics is quite similar in each. Using the
same article count procedure describe above, I produced a monthly time series indicating
The New York Times ’ and USA Today ’s coverage of the economy.6 The resulting monthly
time series, presented in Figure 3.2, correlate at 0.70. In turn, these series provide a com-
parative baseline for The New York Times ’ and USA Today ’s coverage of homosexuality.
The ratio of each paper’s coverage of homosexuality to its coverage of the economy is
presented in Figure 3.3.
USA Today ’s and The New York Times ’ coverage of homosexuality relative to their
respective coverage of the economy are quite similar. In fact, the series correlate at
0.72. Of course, the data generating process in these time series is a joint function of the
newspapers’ coverage of both the economy and homosexuality, so it would be ill-advised to
the over-time change attributable to α1t.
6The keywords are: unemployment and inflation. This keyword set almost certainly undercounts the
coverage of the economy in each newspaper, leaving out stories on trade deficits, market performance,
home sales, and other economic indicators too numerous to count. Thus, they provide a conservative
baseline estimate of the coverage of general economic conditions in each of the observed newspapers. I
have selected these keywords from among the wide-ranging possibilities because of the special role of
these two indicators in short-term political economy vis-a-vis the Phillips Curve (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002).
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Figure 3.2: Media Coverage of the Economy: Monthly Mean Daily Stories
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Figure 3.3: Ratio of Homosexuality Stories to Economy Stories
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attempt to read too much into a superficial inspection of a complex system. Nevertheless,
these data point to the fact that the newspapers examined here, which are explicitly
constructed to appeal to different audiences and which are often taken by scholars and
elites as embracing distinct points of view, share, at least in the period observed, similar
patterns of coverage with respect to homosexuality.7
In addition to these emergent similarities in the newspaper’s relative coverage of ho-
mosexuality, the trends in the raw time series also belie a common set of “high points”
in the two newspapers coverage of homosexuality. In other words, a shared set of salient
events appears to have drawn the media’s attention generally to homosexuality. This
common responsiveness to news-making events for The New York Times and USA Today
may be seen more clearly in Figures 3.4, which reflect the first differences in the detrended
monthly time series of mean daily news items involving homosexuality in each newspaper.
Overlaid, the two series show a common systemic pattern: brief, common periods of large
increases in coverage generally immediately followed by a short period of decreases in
coverage. These patterns suggest a model of media coverage of homosexuality in which
salient news events draw the media’s attention to homosexuality, which produces the ob-
served increases in media coverage. However, these increases appear, for the most part,
short lived as the media moves on to cover other events and issues.
Of course, this does not imply that the observed trends in the data are unrelated to
the the causal events listed above, or others. The increases in coverage over time may
be related to the accumulated effects of identifiable events over time. Identifying these
effects, their decay, or their accumulation, is an empirical matter, though.
7I have made no attempt to code the content of the stories beyond their object. It may well be the
case that these outlets cover the same issue in importantly different ways. Additional research would be
necessary to investigate this speculation.
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3.4 Modeling Influence on the Media
This theory of agenda-setting can be assessed using Box-Tiao (1975) “intervention analy-
ses,” again the strategy employed by Flemming, Bohte, and Wood’s (1997) study of the
effects of Supreme Court decision-making on media attention, though applied to new data
on a new issue. Box-Tiao analyses are used to estimate the effects of an event or events
on a set of time serial observations of some quantity of interest. Specifically, Box-Tiao
methods estimate the equation:
Yt = f(It) +Nt
where :
Yt = Media coverage time series,
72
It = The effect of judicial “interventions,” and
Nt = ARIMA error process.
This design has a number of attractive properties. First, as a matter of internal
validity, intervention analyses—Box-Tiao or some other formulation—are methods for
assessing natural experiments. In this case, the “experiment” examines the effect of
judicial decisions on media coverage of issues relating to homosexuality. While “the rival
hypothesis exists that. . . some more or less simultaneous event may have produced the
shift” in the dependent series (Campbell and Stanley 1963, p. 37), only the identification
of a rival causal event threatens inferences drawn from the assessment of the impact of
the event of interest.
Moreover, Box-Tiao analyses explicitly model ARIMA error processes (the model com-
ponent Nt) by estimating the autoregressive and moving average components of the de-
pendent time series (Box and Jenkins 1976). Thus, the effects of interventions on a time
series are assessed once other sources of dynamic errors in that series have been accounted
for with an appropriate ARIMA model, i.e. the dependent series is reduced to white noise
prior to the estimation of intervention effects.
Thus, to begin, I develop an appropriate ARIMA model of each media coverage series,
which have been logged to ensure variance stationarity. Next, I model the effects of each
judicial decision as a dummy variable where the incidence of a judicial decision involving
gay rights is indicated by a dichotomous variable that is set to zero prior to the relevant
event and “switches on,” changing to one, in the month that decision is announced.
Pulse interventions—those which produce transient changes in the dependent series—are
coded “on” for the month of the intervention and “off” for all other time periods. Step
interventions—those which produce permanent effects in the time series—are coded zero
for time periods prior to the event and one for all other time periods. Finally, I estimate
transfer functions to assess the effects of the interventions on the media time series.
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The flexibility of Box-Tiao analyses, though, produce difficult modeling choices for
time series analysts. As Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) point out, “[I]n Box-Tiao
modeling, there is always some duplicity between specifications involving steps and pulses.
For example, a first order pulse specification with a very slow rate of change parameter is
virtually identical to a zero order step.” These types of modeling choices are ubiquitous
in Box-Jenkins-type analyses and decisions between alternative specifications must ulti-
mately balance theoretical priors and model performance. This reflects the origins of the
Box-Jenkins approach to time series analysis in applied forecasting problems. Here, final
model specifications were derived in a stepwise approach. First, all events were modeled
as zero order pulses. Events that demonstrate a significant influence were subsequently
modeled with increasing complexity, adding decay parameters and treating the interven-
tions as “steps” to the extent that the data supported such specifications. Events without
significant influence, or added complexities that were unsupported by the data, were elim-
inated from the models. The final model estimates for The New York Times and USA
Today are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
3.5 Results and Analysis
The data support the hypotheses derived from Flemming, Bohte, and Wood’s (1997)
theory of media responsiveness. Consistent with the hypotheses, the Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which invalidated a Texas statute and other similar state laws
that criminalized homosexual sodomy, produced a significant, lasting (step) increase in
coverage of homosexual content for both The New York Times and USA Today. Con-
versely, Hurley and BSA failed to produce a significant increase in coverage of homosex-
uality in either paper. Finally, though there were no clear expectations for this case, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans (1996) had a temporary (pulse) influence
on USA Today’ s attention to the issue, though it had no effect on The New York Times.
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I discuss the results for each media outlet more fully below.
3.5.1 The New York Times
The final model for The New York Times’ coverage of homosexuality (Table 3.3) includes
one of the four gay rights cases heard by the Supreme Court in the observed period,
Lawrence v. Texas (2003). This case was best modeled as a step intervention; that is, the
data indicate that Lawrence had a permanent effect on The New York Times’ coverage
of homosexuality. In the month preceding the Court’s decision, The New York Times
printed an average of 4.4 stories a day involving homosexuality in some respect. In the
month the decision was announced, it printed 7.0 homosexuality related stories. This
immediate increase was followed by asustained elevation in the paper’s attention to that
issue. Thus, even though there was a small recession of media coverage of homosexuality—
following an immediate flurry of attention to homosexuality accompanying Lawrence—
post-intervention coverage is significantly higher than pre-intervention coverage.
The magnitude of this effect should be assessed by transforming the logged coefficients
into a quantity of substantive interest. One such quantity, the percent change due to the
first order intervention, is given by:
% Change = 100
[
exp
(
ω0
1− δ1
)
− 1
]
(McCleary and Hay 1980, 174) (3.1)
Using this transformation, the transfer function estimates predict that Lawrence produced
a permanent 39% increase in The New York Times articles involving homosexuality. The
negative first-order transfer function denominator for the Lawrence intervention indicates
that the effect of the case on the media coverage series oscillates before settling into its
equilibrium effect.
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Table 3.3: SCOTUS Decisions and The New York Times Coverage of Homosexuality
Model Component Parameter Estimate
Lawrence v. Texas (Step) ω12 0.48*
(0.15)
δ11 -0.45
†
(0.31)
First-Order Autoregressive (AR1) φ1 0.93*
(0.06)
First-Order Moving Average (MA1) θ1 -0.67*
(0.07)
Mean (Constant) µ 1.51*
(0.07)
*p < 0.05; †p < 0.1 (One-tailed tests). N=192
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3.5.2 USA Today
The final model for USA Today appears in Table 3.4. The results indicate that two cases,
Romer v. Evans (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003) had a significant influence on the
paper’s coverage of homosexuality. The first case, however, was best modeled as a pulse
intervention while the second was best modeled as a step intervention.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans (1996)—which invalidated a voter-
created amendment to Colorado’s constitution that forbade the state or municipali-
ties from extending antidiscrimination protection on the basis of sexual orientation—
temporarily increased USA Today’s attention to homosexuality. In the month preceding
the announcement of the Romer decision, USA Today ran an average of 1.4 stories a day
that involved homosexuality in some respect. In the month of the decision, that figure
increased to 2.4. The δ parameter of 0.75 indicates that Romer’ s influence on this paper
decayed at a relatively brisk pace. The model predicts that logged intervention effect of
0.42 decayed by slightly less than half in two months. In five months, the intervention
effect had approximately a quarter of its initial influence, and the effect of Romer decayed
almost completely by the eighth month. So, while Romer had a temporary influence on
USA Today’ s coverage of homosexuality, the case does not appear to have made a lasting
influence on the prominence of homosexuality as an issue.
On the other hand, Lawrence v. Texas (2003) had a permanent effect on USA To-
day’ s attention to homosexuality. In the month preceding the decision, the paper offered
an average of 0.9 stories per day involving homosexuality; there were an average of 1.8
stories per day in the the month of the decision. Using the percent change transforma-
tion implemented above, the model predicts a permanent 37% increase in USA Today’ s
coverage of homosexuality. As with The New York Times’ model, the negative first-order
transfer function denominator suggests that Lawrence caused some oscillation in coverage
of homosexuality before the equilibrium effect was achieved.
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Table 3.4: SCOTUS Decisions and USA Today Coverage of Homosexuality
Model Component Parameter Estimate
Romer v. Evans (Pulse) ω01 0.42*
(0.25)
δ11 0.75*
(0.36)
Lawrence v. Texas (Step) ω12 0.55*
(0.24)
δ11 -0.75*
(0.19)
First-Order Autoregressive (AR1) φ1 0.90*
(0.04)
First-Order Moving Average (MA1) θ1 -0.50*
(0.08)
Mean (Constant) µ 0.31*
(0.11)
*p < 0.05; †p < 0.1 (One-tailed tests). N=192
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3.5.3 Conclusions: The Supreme Court and Media Attention to
Homosexuality
Here, I have sought to confirm and extend existing research that has demonstrated an
agenda setting affect in the national media flowing from the Supreme Court by analyzing
media coverage of homosexuality. In a period of fifteen years, stretching from 1990 to
2005, the Supreme Court heard, by the criteria employed here, four cases involving gay
rights. Examining two stylistically distinct newspapers, The New York Times and USA
Today, reveals that these media outlets’ attention to homosexuality has been, in part,
influenced by the Court. These results are an out-of-sample verification of Flemming,
Bohte, and Wood’s (1997) generalization that the media increases its attention to issues
in which the Court’s decisions produce important policy changes.
Both papers demonstrated a lasting (step) response to Lawrence v. Texas in 2003;
each permanently increased coverage of homosexuality-related items by 37-39%. Lawrence
substantially expanded the scope of gay rights in the United States. By invalidating homo-
sexual sodomy statutes, the case “markedly rearranged the prior distribution of political
benefits, either material or symbolic, for various segments of the population” (Flemming,
Bohte, and Wood 1997, p. 1247). Lawrence also overturned a prominent privacy decision
(Bowers v. Hardwick 1986), yielding a landmark change in the national legal status of
gays and decriminalizing homosexual sexual. Moreover, the case hinted that the Supreme
Court might be amenable to other claims of privacy rights by homosexuals. These re-
arrangements of political benefits are not only news in their own, yielding extensive news
coverage of the decision itself, it provoked the mobilization of political resources to op-
pose further expansions of gay rights, particularly in the case of Lawrence, producing the
changes in media coverage of homosexuality. Hurley et al v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group (1995) and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), on the other hand,
produced no such effects. In both Hurley and BSA, the Court merely upheld a status quo,
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affirming the right of private organizations to exclude homosexuals. Because these cases
yielded no change in the distribution of political benefits, these cases yielded less news
value and provoked less reallocation of political resources to the issue of homosexual’s
political and social status than Lawrence.
Finally, the murky theoretical status of Romer is reflected in the data. While USA
Today temporarily increased its coverage of homosexuality in the wake of the decision,
this effect was short-lived while The New York Times ’ coverage of homosexuality was
unmoved. This observed heterogeneity in the newspapers’ responsiveness to Romer may
be a function of their respective audiences. The New York Times, though it has a national
audience, is, in the end, a local paper for New York City. Municipal concerns, New York
state news, and regional news from the mid-Atlantic, are over-represented in its pages.
USA Today, on the other hand, is an explicitly national newspaper. Though Romer v.
Evans had implications for that status of homosexuals in Colorado and in other states
likely to adopt similar constitutional measures, the case had little direct influence on New
York, where such a provision had little chance of success. Though surely there are other
plausible explanations for the observation that USA Today responded to Romer in a more
significant way than The New York Times.
Still, the results reported here also offer a refinement to existing agenda-setting re-
search by treating the media as a set of independent news outlets rather than as an
undifferentiated whole. The heterogenous responses to some Supreme Court cases shown
here demonstrate that, for a variety of economic and editorial reasons, various news outlets
may not respond to the same stimuli in the same way. While evidence of systematic media
responsiveness to some newsmaking events is important, to the extent that scholars might
expect some media outlets’ coverage to be more influential in a given political context, it
is worthwhile to examine media content in specific providers or sets of providers rather
than to assume away potentially interesting variance. And while modest differences of
this sort emerge in this study of two print media outlets, more substantial and important
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variance might be uncovered across mediums—print, broadcast, and electronic. Exploring
this heterogeneity, particularly in terms of reassessing established media effects findings
in one or another medium, will undoubtedly prove fruitful for scholars.
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Appendix A
Control Models of Legislative Voting
The independent variables included in the choice models of legislative voting contained
in Chapter 2 are are limited to those derived directly from the theoretical models. How-
ever, the inclusion of additional control variables, reflecting legislators’ partisanship and
overall ideologies, does not affect the estimates of these theoretically relevant variables.
In models estimated including party and first dimension DW-NOMINATE Scores (Poole
and Rosenthal 1997), the parameter estimates on the explanatory variables included in
the original models maintain their sign and significance. Moreover, for both the the House
and the Senate estimates neither the overall fit of the models nor their predictive power
are greatly increased by the inclusion of these additional variables. The full results of
these extended control models are presented below in Tables A.1 and A.2.
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Table A.1: Logit Analysis of Senate Flipping (Appendix)
(1 = “Flip”)
Predictors 89 Amend’t 90 Amend’t
ACLU Rating 0.09*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.06)
1990 Reelection -1.54** -2.21**
(0.89) (0.97)
Party (Democrat=1) -4.33** 1.53
(2.36) (2.26)
1st Dimension DW-NOMINATE -7.24 4.46
(6.24) (6.58)
Constant -2.47 -8.75***
(2.42) (3.50)
χ2 85.02 83.48
Pseudo R2 0.68 0.68
PRE 0.81 0.75
N 90 91
Note: Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
One tailed tests.
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Table A.2: Ordered Logit Analysis of House Voting Cohorts (Appendix)
(Consistent Opponents=2, “Flippers”=1, Consistent Supporters=0)
Predictors Effects
ACLU Rating 0.08***
(0.01)
1988 Win Margin 0.00
(0.01)
Competitive District -1.33**
(0.72)
Party (Democrat=1) 0.97*
(0.69)
1st Dimension DW-NOMINATE 2.06*
(1.43)
Cut Line 1 3.87***
(0.84)
Cut Line 2 8.55***
(0.66)
χ2 318.26
Pseudo R2 0.48
PRE 0.56
N 396
Note: Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
One tailed tests.
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